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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 70 FALL 1996 NUMBER 4
A "COMMENT J" PARRY TO HOWARD
LATIN'S "GOOD" WARNINGS, BADPRODUCTS, AND COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS
KENNETH IAN WEISSMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Wherever manufactured products go, product-related inju-
ries follow closely behind. This remains true despite a dearth of
incentives for manufacturers to build safe products: reduced in-
surance costs and the ability to utilize the product's safety record
in marketing provides sellers with a competitive edge, while the
negative publicity and massive tort judgments spawned by prod-
uct accidents deter manufacturers from producing defective
products. An absolute victory in the battle to prevent product-
related injuries can never be declared, because some socially
beneficial products are inherently unsafe' or cannot be made ac-
" Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LIP, New York AB.
Dartmouth College, J.D. Harvard University. The author would like to thank Professor
Jon D. Hanson of the Harvard Law School for his invaluable assistance in writing this
Article. The author would also like to thank Jeffrey S. Lichtman of Skadden, Arps for
his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
'See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) ("There are
many cases ... particularly in the area of new drugs, where the risk, although known
to exist, cannot be ... narrowly limited and where knowledge does not yet explain the
reason for the risk or specify those to whom it applies .... In such cases ... the drug is
fit and its danger is reasonable only if the balance is struck in favor of its use."); see
also RESTATFMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) ("Many products cannot
possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily
involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption."); id. at cmt. k ("There are
some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of
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cident-proof without imposing prohibitive costs.2 Furthermore,
"no one has developed a system to match the creativity of the
consumer in finding new and sometimes unsafe ways to use
products."3
Given the inevitability of product-related injuries, the legal
system must attempt to allocate their costs in a rational and just
manner.' Under both strict products liability and negligence re-
gimes, manufacturers may be forced to absorb part or all of these
costs. Indeed, there is an "ancient" basis for the "special respon-
sibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters
into the business of supplying human beings with products" that
can injure them and their property.' When a plaintiff charges a
manufacturer with negligence, courts determine whether the
manufacturer's actions were "reasonable."6 Even if the manufac-
turer's actions were reasonable, a court may hold the manufac-
turer partially or wholly liable for the resulting damages if, for
example, the manufacturer is deemed to have superior knowl-
being made safe for their intended and ordinary use...."). See generally WARREN
FREEDMAN, DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A PRIMER FOR PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS 677-80 (1996) (discussing "unavoidably unsafe products" defense).
2 See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Or. 1974) ("In design
cases, the cost of the change necessary to alleviate the danger in design may be so
great that the article would be priced out of the market and no one would buy it even
though it was of high utility."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT]
("Society does not benefit from products that are excessively safe - for example, auto-
mobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20 miles per hour - any more than it bene-
fits from products that are too risky.").
3 THE 1984 CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY REPORT ON
PRODUCT SAFETY IN AMERICA 42 (1985).
' See LEWIS BASS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING DEFECTS
14 (1986) ("Product liability was and continues to be the creature of social policy.
Considerations of a manufacturer's responsibility and limits of responsibility are
made on the basis of what is best for society and the individuals that make up so-
ciety.").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965). For a history of modern
American products liability law, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the
Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 695-712
(1993); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort
Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 620-34 (1992).
6 The most famous statement of the balancing test used to determine whether an
actor has exercised reasonable care is the "BPL" formula appearing in Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
Under Judge Hand's analysis, courts balance the burden to the manufacturer, "B",
against the probability of occurrence, "P", multiplied by the degree of injury, "L. Id.
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edge of how to prevent accidents, and can spread the costs of li-
ability to all consumers through price increases.7
A manufacturer can minimize or avoid liability for accidents
by reducing or terminating production of a particular product,
revising a product's design so that it is less likely to cause inju-
ries, or providing warnings that instruct consumers on how to
use the product safely. Warning labels inexpensively inform
consumers of a product's inherent dangers and allow them to
make fully informed purchasing decisions. Once a consumer has
purchased a product, he or she will be able to avoid the product's
foreseeable dangers for which there is a warning! The American
Law Institute's Reporter's Study: Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury states the purpose of product warnings as fol-
lows:
[T]o provide users with information about risk levels so that us-
ers can harmonize their use preferences with their safety pref-
erences in an informed way, to provide users with information
about safe and dangerous use so that they can choose optimal
risk reduction strategies, or to provide both types of informa-
tion.9
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. c (1965) ("[P]ublic policy de-
mands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for con-
sumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of produc-
tion against which liability insurance can be obtained ... "). For an introduction to the
debate over the desirability of strict liability, see RESTATEMENT (THRD) DRAFT § 2
cmt. a; Croley & Hanson, supra note 5, at 713-21; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The
First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990); Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60
FORDHAAM L. REV. 819 (1992).
8 See Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approach to Failure-to-Warn
Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 121, 164 (1992) ("The costs of [reading and obeying a warning
label] are minimal - a few minutes, at most, spent in the process of reading - and the
benefits are enormous - the avoidance of serious personal injury or property dam-
age."); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthe-
sis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 398 (1988) (arguing that "warnings should be regarded as gen-
erally efficacious"); see also M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability:
Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221, 222 (1987) ("[Nlearly any product ca-
pable of causing injury can or could be rendered less hazardous by conveying effective
warnings.. ).
9 2 AMiERICAN LAW INSTrirUTE, REPORTERS STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILTY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY - APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 66 (1991)
[hereinafter ALI REPORTER'S STUDY ]; see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twersky, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to
Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 285 (1990) (asserting that dual function of warnings is to
"reduce the risk of product-related injury by allowing consumers to behave more care-
fully than if they remained ignorant of risks associated with product use" and to
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In both negligence and strict liability actions, an adequate
warning can shield a manufacturer from liability," since con-
sumers who overlook warnings "are held to have assumed the
risk or to have been guilty of contributory negligence,"" and a
product that warns users of its risks is not "unreasonably dan-
gerous." 2 This principle, set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, has been dubbed the "comment j presumption." Critics of
current product warning doctrines argue that permitting manu-
facturers to avoid liability by adding an adequate warning label
keeps accident levels unnecessarily high and benefits manufac-
turers at the expense of consumers." Furthermore, critics argue,
warnings are not always read or followed, and a legal doctrine
that assumes the opposite is therefore quixotic. The debate over
product warnings is interesting both intellectually, as part of the
larger battle concerning which legal standards should govern a
manufacturer's liability for its products,' and practically, be-
cause all of us, as consumers, face numerous product warnings
every day.
This Article addresses the issue of product warnings
obliquely, by analyzing Professor Howard Latin's comprehensive
criticism of the effectiveness of warnings in his recent article
"Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations
(""Good" Warnings").15 Part I of this Article briefly surveys the
"provide consumers with the information necessary to choose whether or not they wish
to encounter certain kinds of risks on a 'take it or leave it' basis"); Schwartz, supra
note 8, at 396 ("Warnings serve two functions: They indicate risk levels and provide
directions for safe use.").
10 The manufacturer is not absolved of liability if an injured consumer can predi-
cate liability on other theories, such as defective design or manufacture. See infra
notes 321-27 and accompanying text.
'1 ALI REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 9, at 38.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
is Compare Howard A. Latin, 'Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (1994) ("Manufacturers should ... be re-
quired to incorporate safety devices that can protect tired users whenever feasible
against foreseeable risks from mishandling products.") with ALI REPORTER'S STUDY,
supra note 9, at 66 ("Not only is complete safety unachievable, but it is inconsistent
with a serious interest in warning issues. This interest presupposes a commitment to
individual autonomy -- within limits, to letting informed people decide for themselves
what products to buy and how to use products.").
14 For an introduction to various views informing this debate, see W. KIP VISCusI,
REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1991); Croley & Hanson, supra note 5; Schwartz,
supra note 8 at 360.
" Latin, supra note 13. Professor Latin also discusses some of his objections to
comment j in a previous article: Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and
Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677 (1985).
[Vol. 70:629
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legal duty of a seller to warn product users of certain risks, fo-
cusing on the treatment of product warnings in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and the most recent Restatement (Third) Draft.
Part II of this Article expounds the powerful criticisms of the Re-
statement approaches proffered in "Good" Warnings.1" Part III
attempts to repel Professor Latin's criticisms and bolster the
practical underpinnings of the Restatement approaches. Finally,
Part IV discusses the problem of judicial confusion in dealing
with warnings and the need to develop objective criteria by
which courts and manufacturers can properly assess the effec-
tiveness of warnings.
I. THE SELLER'S DUTY TO WARN CONSUMERS ABOUT TE RISKS
OF ITS PRODUCTS
A. General Principles
Courts and commentators have attempted to balance the
conflicting societal interests at issue in product-related accident
lawsuits by developing the doctrine of the "duty to warn."' Un-
der this doctrine, which exposes sellers to liability under negli-
'6 In "Good" Warnings, Professor Latin attacks the provisions of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Third) Draft concerning product warnings as
"unrealistic," "inefficient," and "inequitable." Latin, supra note 13, at 1294.
17 Under strict liability, a seller's failure to warn may result in liability if
the warning deficiency renders the product "unreasonably dangerous" ....
Under negligence principles, a supplier may be liable for injury or damage
incident to a failure to warn adequately when it knows or should know that
the product is likely to pose an unreasonable risk without warnings, but
fails to exercise reasonable care to inform users of the risk. In warranty, an
inadequate warning may ... constitut[e] a breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability.... [Iun the context of failure to warn jurisprudence, the
functional characteristics of strict liability and negligence theories are al-
most indistinguishable.
Madden, supra note 8, at 222, 243 (citations omitted); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
DRAFT § 2 cmt. h (Reporter's note) ("The general obligation to provide reasonable in-
structions and warnings is so widely recognized that extensive citation is unneces-
sary.").
The doctrine of the "duty to warn" has been heavily emphasized in the product
liability area over the last twenty years. See Mark R. Lehto & James M. Miller, The
Effectiveness of Warning Labels, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 225, 225 (1988). Lehto and Miller
attribute the proliferation of such litigation to "the relative ease of initiating tort
actions based upon inadequate warnings, the difficulty in defending against such
actions, and the 'apparently' low cost of placing warnings on products." Id. (citations
omitted); see also VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 132 ("The major issue is no longer the
physical properties of the product but rather how the product will interact with the
product user.").
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gence, strict liability, or warranty theories for products that lack
adequate warning labels, commercial vendors of products "owe
users and consumers a duty to warn of product-related risks that
are not obvious."18 For the purposes of this Article, the most im-
portant consequence of a product's accompaniment by an
"adequate"19 warning under the Restatement (Second) is that the
product is deemed not "unreasonably dangerous.""
Generally, the duty to warn attaches for products that:
(1) are intrinsically or inherently dangerous to the ultimate
user, (2) present a high risk of danger under certain unusual
and unintended uses, (3) are dangerous only to a few individu-
als who possess an idiosyncratic susceptibility, and (4) are un-
avoidably unsafe.2'
In addition, the duty to warn extends only to those dangers "that
are known or reasonably foreseeable and anticipated at the time
the product is placed into the stream of commerce," 22 and does
not apply to risks that are "obvious."" While the seller does not
need to warn about dangers that could not reasonably be
anticipated, it must "keep abreast of the current state of
knowledge and advances of its product available through
research, reports of dangers, scientific developments and
technical breakthroughs."24 The seller, therefore, is "held to the
"s Henderson & Twersky, supra note 9, at 265; see infra notes 23-24 and accompa-
nying text (discussing obviousness of product defects).
" "Failure-to-warn law does not require manufacturers to fashion product warn-
ings that are ideal in every way. It simply demands that those warnings be 'adequate."
Jacobs, supra note 8, at 127; see infra notes 232-284 and accompanying text (analyzing
debate over adequacy of warnings).
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. j, k (1965).
21 James B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct For Safe Use in Strict Tort Li-
ability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 531 (1982).
2 Id. at 543; see also Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and
Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
689, 693 (1985) (arguing that only defects that are "reasonably foreseeable" or
"discoverable" should render manufacturers liable for failure to warn).
2 In most jurisdictions, "there exists no duty to warn of certain obviously hazard-
ous conditions." Madden, supra note 8, at 253; see Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d
1404, 1414 (10th Cir. 1988); Phelps v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 303 (7th
Cir. 1987). For criticism of the "obvious danger" rule, see Campos v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 485 A.2d 305, 309-11 (N.J. 1984); Jacobs, supra note 8, at 128-37.
24 Sales, supra note 21, at 526. For arguments that a seller's duty to warn should
not be limited by foreseeability of product risks, see Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 447 A-2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982) (holding manufacturer strictly liable even though
providing warning was impossible because risk was undiscoverable at time of manu-
facture, since "imposition of liability for failure to warn of dangers which were undis-
[Vol. 70:629
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standards of an expert on the particular product and presumed
to know all the dangers that exist in a product at the time it is
marketed."'
Some courts have taken as "an article of faith" the proposi-
tion that it is easier and preferable for a court to decide a case on
duty to warn grounds than on design defect grounds." Others
have emphasized the limited utility of warnings, given the in-
herent danger of certain products and the cognitive limitations of
consumers." Regardless of the approach adopted, the duty to
warn has been prominent in products liability litigation and
manufacturers have responded by "both increas[ing] and
ma[king] more explicit the warning labels they provide with
their products....""
coverable at the time of manufacture will advance the goals and policies sought to be
achieved by our strict liability rules"); Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't
Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law
is Wrong, 61 TENN L. REV. 1125, 1135 (1994) ("The negligence approach protects sup-
pliers from liability for risks beyond their knowledge. This encourages suppliers to
leave risks outside their knowledge in order to forestall liability. The negligence ap-
proach, in short, creates an incentive for ignorance.").
2 Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547; see Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d
330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984) ("In assessing what hazards are foreseeable, a manufacturer is
held to the status of an expert.").
For the liability system to be fair and efficient, most courts agree that the
balancing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing
must be done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance tech-
niques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution. To hold a manu-
facturer liable for a risk that was not foreseeable when the product was
marketed might foster increased manufacturer investment in safety. But
such investment by definition would be a matter of guesswork.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT § 2 cmt. a.
"' A.D. Twersky et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability -- De-
sign Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 500 (1976); see also
James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUm. L. REV. 1531, 1531 (1973) ("Courts are inher-
ently unsuited to the task of establishing product safety standards in cases involving
the liability of manufacturers" because of polycentric nature of such task); Jacobs, su-
pra note 8, at 122-23 ("For the past thirty years ... failure-to-warn law has appeared to
function tolerably well without benefit ofjudicial adjustment or academic influence.").
27 See Kirk v. Hans Corp. of N.C., 16 F.3d 705, 708 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Obvious
risks may be unreasonable risks, and there is no justification for departing from
negligence ... principles merely because the dangers are patent.") (citing Owens v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Mich. 1982)).
Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 225.
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B. Treatment of the Duty to Warn in the Restatement
1. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts establish-
es a rule of strict liability for a seller of "any product in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property" when the product causes physical injury.29
While sellers "may be required to give directions or warning, on
the container" in order to remove certain products from the
realm of the "unreasonably dangerous," they are not required to
warn of risks that are commonplace or result from overuse of the
product."0 In addition, a seller is not liable if the injury results
from "abnormal handling" of a product.3 Once a seller provides
the user with an adequate warning, the Restatement (Second) af-
fords the seller the following presumption: "Where [an adequate]
warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will
be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning,
which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous."32
2. The Restatement (Third) Draft
The American Law Institute is currently developing the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.33 The most recent
29 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (a)-(b) (1965). Section 402A applies only
if. "(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and (b) the
product is expected to ... reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold." Id. The Restatement does not explicitly state
whether injured non-users and non-consumers are covered by the protection of Sec-
tion 402A. Id. at cmt. o. "[I]n some circumstances a warning will not have any effect
on a class of foreseeable users.... Thus, for example, where foreseeable users are ...
casual bystanders who may not be alerted to a warning, liability will follow." Twer-
sky et al., supra note 26, at 506.
'0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). According to comment j,
"a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them, which
are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a
long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and
recognized." Id. For example, "[glood whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics .... "
Id. at cmt. i.
31 Id. at cmt. h.
33 Id. at cmt. j.
See Michael J. Toke, Note, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design Defective-
ness in American Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 239, 239
(1996). "In May, 1995 the American Law Institute adopted Tentative Draft No. 2 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability." Id. "Despite the A.L.I.'s adoption of
[Vol. 70:629
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draft separates the standards of liability for defects resulting
from faulty manufacturing, faulty design, and inadequate warn-
ings.34  "[Slellers must provide reasonable instructions and
warnings about risks of injury associated with their products.""
If they fail to provide adequate instructions and warnings, the
product is deemed to be defective.36
While the Restatement (Third) Draft imposes strict liability
on manufacturers under the theory of manufacturing defects,
design defects and inadequate warnings "are predicated on a dif-
ferent concept of responsibility," namely, negligence.37 Thus, in a
warnings defect cast, a "risk-utility balancing" is necessary.38
The aim of this balancing is to achieve the optimal level of
safety, not absolute safety, since "[slociety does not benefit from
products that are excessively safe .... ... In addition, imposing a
burden on users of "proper product use" fosters equitable results
and prevents the subsidization of careless consumers by careful
ones.
40
Courts use a reasonableness test in judging the adequacy of
product warnings. The warning must not only alert users to the
existence of avoidable risks, but should also "inform users and
consumers of nonobvious risks that unavoidably inhere in using
or consuming the product."41 Requiring an adequate warning
enables consumers to make an informed decision on whether to
Tentative Draft No. 2, the debate as to the appropriate standard to govern manufac-
turers' liability for their design choices is unlikely to cease." Id. at 286.
'4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT § 2.
' Id. at cmt. I
3 The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT § 2 (c) provides that:
a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been re-
duced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by
the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
product not reasonably safe.
Id.
37 Id, at § 2 cmt. a.
38 Id.; see also Henderson & Twersky, supra note 9, at 296 (explaining that risk-
utility balance involves balancing of cost to warn of remote risks against benefit of
reduced accident costs).
39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT § 2(c) cmt. a.
40Id.
"' Id. at cmt t A warning is required only when the risks inherent in using the
product for its particular purpose would not be obvious to a "reasonable product
user." Id. Since reasonable people may disagree as to which risks are "obvious," that
is a question to be decided by the trier of fact. Id.
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purchase the product.42
II. HOWARD LATIN'S TREATMENT OF THE COMMENT J
PRESUMPTION
Howard Latin's "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cogni-
tive Limitations" provides a comprehensive criticism of the
"comment j presumption."" Professor Latin argues that the
presence of an adequate warning should not "dilute the manufac-
turer's responsibility for accident prevention."4" He supports this
position by analyzing purportedly severe limitations on the
abilities of consumers "to receive, comprehend, and act upon"
product warnings.46 Professor Latin concludes that these limita-
tions vitiate the effectiveness of many warnings and that "courts
should not allow manufacturers to shift the burden of precaution
when safer product designs or marketing strategies could feasi-
bly reduce accident risks."47 In challenging whether warnings
are effective enough to justify the comment j presumption, Pro-
fessor Latin touches upon the central issue in product warning
law.
48
A. Two Behavioral Paradigms
Professor Latin begins his analysis by contrasting two be-
havioral paradigms that comprise opposing extremes on the
42 Id. at cmt. f.
43 Latin, supra note 13.
4 Professor Latin uses the phrase "comment j presumption" as a way of denoting a
cluster of functionally equivalent legal treatments: Courts may foreclose assessment of
overall product safety on the rationale that an adequate warning is a sufficient defense
under the comment j presumption, that the failure to heed warnings is a superseding
cause even if the product design is unreasonably dangerous, or that the consumer's
failure to heed warnings is an unforeseeable misuse of the product. Id. at 1257.
41 Id. at 1205.
46 Id. at 1195.
47 Id. at 1198; see Croley & Hanson, supra note 5, at 786-92 (discussing alternative
theory, "enterprise liability," which places full responsibility for accident costs on
manufacturers in order to encourage them to warn of all "residually preventable acci-
dents").
48 Professor Latin's article is an extensively researched, persuasive legal article.
In the second of his article's three sections, entitled "Why Warnings Often Prove In-
effective," Professor Latin explores the reasons why he contends warnings are inef-
fective, and rebuts arguments of those who disagree. The most interesting and divi-
sive arguments from this section of Professor Latin's article will be discussed in this
Article. In order to achieve a thorough understanding of Professor Latin's article, it
should be read in its entirety.
[Vol. 70:629
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spectrum of accident-causing behavior. He contends that these
models serve as underlying assumptions for the majority of
products liability law.9 The first model, that of the "Rational
Risk Calculator" ("RRC"), presumes that people maximize utility
by weighing the perceived costs and benefits of activities before
deciding whether to engage in particular behavior. 0 Under the
RRC model, people can increase their utility by purchasing
cheaper products that are less safe, and using the money saved
on activities they value more than accident prevention.51 Propo-
nents of the RRC model believe that individuals are free to
gamble with their resources, but must also be willing to assume
the costs of their choices.52 In addition, these proponents contend
that it is fundamentally unfair to charge risk-averse consum-
ers-those who choose not to gamble with their resources-
higher prices in order to subsidize the accidents costs of those
who choose to gamble."
The second behavioral paradigm that Professor Latin dis-
cusses, and the one with which he sympathizes, is the "Mistake
and Momentary Inattention" Model ("MMI").54 This model em-
phasizes the cognitive and temporal restrictions that "preclude
assessing all relevant considerations in a 'rational' manner."5
Under the MMI paradigm, product-related accidents result from
mistakes and carelessness rather than rational risk-utility calcu-
lations.56 Thus, allowing losses to lie with consumers would not
4 See Latin, supra note 13, at 1199.
1; Id.
5' Id.; see Schwartz, supra note 8, at 357-58 (explaining that utility maximiza-
tion involves personal decisions between minimizing risk and accompanying cost of
risk maximization).
52 Latin, supra note 13, at 1199.
' Id. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 5, at 781-82 (stating that under theories
other than RRC, "low risk consumers subsidize high risk consumers and thus will be
less willing to pay either to insure against or to prevent the loss"); George L. Priest,
A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1348 (1981)
(asserting that consumers can be separated into different levels of risk based upon
their accident probabilities and that by adopting liability framework with single
level of protection, high-risk consumers are not benefited while low-risk consumers
are penalized).
Latin, supra note 13, at 1199; see also Howard Latin, Activity Levels, Due Care,
and Selective Realism in Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 487
(1987) ("[The common economic assumption that all actors are 'rational utility maxi-
mizers' is incompatible with effective legal analysis.").
5' Latin, supra note 13, at 1199.
Id. at 1199-1200.
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deter most product-related injuries." Where "occasional defi-
cient behavior by users is inevitable and predictable from the ac-
tuarial perspective of the manufacturer, and if a feasible design
improvement would guard against the resulting risks," the MMI
model precludes manufacturers from diluting their responsibility
for accidents simply by issuing a warning.58
Professor Latin emphasizes that the choice between these
two paradigms has important ramifications for the role assigned
to warnings."9 Since RRC adherents emphasize consumer choice
in safety levels, they are likely to support the comment j pre-
sumption." In contrast, because MMI adherents believe that
accidents result from the carelessness and cognitive limitations
of product users, they assert that "strict product liability and
regulation may be necessary to encourage the development of
relatively 'fool-proof products whenever greater safety is feasi-
ble."6
1
B. The Frequent Ineffectiveness of Warnings
In "Good" Warnings, Professor Latin argues that allowing
manufacturers to be absolved of liability for some product-
related injuries merely because they issue product warnings
would be fatuous, since these warnings often prove ineffective.
The first reason Professor Latin posits for the ineffectiveness of
warnings is that many people simply fail to read them. 2 While
such failure may result from deliberate risk-taking or unusual
carelessness, Professor Latin emphasizes several other factors
that may contribute to the ineffectiveness of product warnings.'
These factors recognize that: a certain portion of the population
is illiterate; some products are intended for children and "other
users who are frequently inattentive, unable or unwilling to de-
vote the time and effort needed to read detailed warnings"; users
may lose warnings not attached to products; some people rely on
"learned intermediaries," while others rely on their general
57 Id.
-8 Id. at 1205.
"9 Id. at 1197-98.
60 Latin, supra note 13, at 1201.
61 Id. at 1202.
12 Id. at 1208.
13 Id. at 1207-20. In summarizing Professor Latin's argument, this Article com-




knowledge and experience; detailed warnings can "overload" con-
sumers' cognitive capacities; and competing demands on con-
sumers' time and attention prevent them from giving the neces-
sary attention to warnings.6
The second reason that leads Professor Latin to conclude
that warnings are often ineffective is that consumers frequently
fail to understand the "good" warnings they read." Professor
Latin provides several explanations for this conclusion, including
that: it is difficult for warnings to strike the proper balance be-
tween detail and clarity; complex warnings may be ambiguous;
users may be uncertain about the consequences of misuse; users
may lack the education necessary to evaluate warnings; cogni-
tive heuristics often lead users to ignore warnings; and compet-
ing demands divert the time and attention of product users from
warnings."6
The third and final reason Professor Latin offers for the inef-
fectiveness of warnings is that some consumers fail to follow
good warnings that they have read and understood. In support
of this contention, Professor Latin asserts that consumers often
have imperfect memories, are overconfident, act reflexively dur-
ing emergencies, disregard low-probability risks, and do not find
manufacturer warnings credible." Thus, in Professor Latin's
view, the comment j presumption that "people will obey all 'good'
warnings" is an "unrealistic behavioral presumption."69
C. Legal Ramifications of the Comment J Presumption
As a result of this purported ineffectiveness of product
warnings, Professor Latin finds that the comment j presumption
is an obstacle to judicial assessment of "alternative [and pre-
sumably more effective] means to improve safety."" By allowing
manufacturers to rely on product warnings and avoid liability,
" Id. at 1208.
Latin, supra note 13, at 1220-21.
66 Id. at 1221-42; see also Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in
the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U.
CIN. L. REV. 38, 50-66 (1983) (enumerating problems confronting designers of effec-
tive product warnings).
67 Latin, supra note 13, at 1242.
' Id. at 1242-48.
9 Id. at 1196. Professor Latin concludes this section of "Good Warnings" by pre-
senting, and then refuting, three "Rational Risk Calculator' Rebuttals" to his presen-
tation. See id. at 1249-1257.
7' Id. at 1257.
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courts forego the opportunity to assess the efficiency of alterna-
tive safety measures, such as safer product designs, safer substi-
tute products, alternative marketing strategies, and more com-
prehensive warnings.7'
Professor Latin further contends that the comment j pre-
sumption's bar to compensation is inconsistent with several
products liability doctrines "that allow full or partial recoveries
despite deficient behavior by users."72  He first asserts that it
would be inconsistent for courts to allow manufacturers to side-
step "foreseeable inattention to warnings," when these manufac-
turers are "required to consider protective measures for reducing
the hazards of foreseeable product mishandling."73 Second, since
the user's failure to discover a product defect does not constitute
contributory negligence under Section 402A comment n, a user
should not be barred from compensation if he unreasonably fails
to locate and comprehend a warning. 4 Third, while comparative
negligence has gained widespread acceptance, the comment j
presumption functions as a complete bar to recovery. 5 Fourth,
the presumption bars non-product user victims from claiming
that the manufacturer and the product user are jointly and sev-
erally liable when the user did not heed a legally adequate
warning.76 Finally, although the patent danger rule has "fallen
into disfavor, 7 7 comment j allows manufacturers to market dan-
gerous products with impunity if they simply warn users of the
product's hazards.78
Professor Latin concludes "Good" Warnings by discussing
three alternative legal treatments of warnings: risk-utility bal-
ancing which includes warnings; risk-utility balancing without
7' Latin, supra note 13, at 1259-75.
12 Id. at 1276.
"' Id. at 1277.
74 Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negli-
gence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or
to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand, the
form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unrea-
sonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes
under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).7" Latin, supra note 13, at 1196; see also Uptain v. Huntington Lab., Inc., 723
P.2d 1322, 1326 (Colo. 1986) (adopting comment j as applicable rule and concluding
that product misuse absolves manufacturer from liability).
Latin, supra note 13, at 1279.
7 Id. at 1279.
78 Id. at 1281.
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warnings; and "true strict liability."79
III. A RESPONSE TO "GooD" WARNINGS' SUBSECTION, "WHY
WARNINGS OFTEN PROVE INEFFECTIVE"
The majority of "Good" Warnings is devoted to the argument
that it is unrealistic to assume that product users follow warn-
ings with the frequency required to justify comment j. Adequate
counters to Professor Latin's animadversions on warning effec-
tiveness, or to his argument that consumers' failure to follow
warnings should negate the comment j presumption, will vitiate
"Good" Warnings. After developing Professor Latin's arguments
in order to present them fairly, this section of the Article at-
tempts to refute his arguments and demonstrate the functional
necessity of comment j.
Professor Latin commences the subsection "Why Warnings
Often Prove Ineffective" with an ad horrendum litany of the
daily "innumerable risks" to which product users are exposed."
The fact that "almost all products present substantial risks if
improperly manufactured, designed, or used," however, is not
sufficient to justify an anti-comment j approach.81 First, the
comment j presumption does not absolve a manufacturer who
provides adequate warnings from liability for an improperly
manufactured or designed product. 2 Second, the Restatement
drafters specifically designed the comment j presumption to pre-
vent the improper use of products, the residual danger that Pro-
fessor Latin fears. The mere inherent potential of any product to
cause injury, therefore, does not argue for or against comment j.
Professor Latin's second criticism of the comment j pre-
sumption is that "[pleople would have to read, understand, re-
member and follow innumerable product warnings to protect
themselves from all product-related risks they may confront."83
7' Id. at 1282-94.
[Pleople are exposed each day to innumerable risks created by appliances
that may malfunction or be mishandled; by potentially toxic pollutants,
food additives, and other chemical substances; by cosmetics, drugs, and
cleansing agents that may be improperly applied and are inherently dan-
gerous for some sensitive individuals; by machine tools, presses, and other
industrial or occupational equipment; and by hazardous transportation and
recreation devices.
Latin, supra note 13 at 1206.
81 Id. at 1206.
62 See infra notes 321-27 and accompanying text.
8 Latin, supra note 13, at 1206.
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This challenge, although facially formidable, is misleading. It
consolidates a list of risks to which a person may be exposed over
time and erroneously implies that a person must continuously
juggle numerous product warnings in his head regardless of
when he actually uses the products. This argument fails to con-
sider the actions of a reasonable product user. For example, a
rational person will not be distracted by the warnings accompa-
nying the microwave oven that cooked his breakfast during his
or her drive to work.
A. Failure to Read Product Warnings84
1. Functional Illiteracy
The first reason Professor Latin offers for the ineffectiveness
of warnings is that consumers may simply not read them.' Pro-
fessor Latin's first explanation for this phenomenon is functional
illiteracy. 6 There are several ways, however, to address this
problem. One way is simply to recognize that a product warning
is not "adequate" under comment j when it is foreseeable that
many of the product's users will be functionally illiterate in Eng-
lish, unless the warning takes this into account.87 For example, a
Professor Latin ignores the phenomena of intentional risk-taking and egregious
laxity, which are likely to explain why some consumers may not read warnings. The
former is inconsistent with his MMI paradigm, while the latter is awkward to defend.
85 Id. at 1207.
86 Id. at 1207-08.
'7 Comment j allows manufacturers to assume users have read the warnings on a
product and, in most states, a plaintiffs failure to read a product warning constitutes
contributory negligence. See, e.g., Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293,
299-300 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that under Nebraska's adoption of comment j, seller
can assume adequate warnings will be read and failure to read warnings precludes as-
sertion that warning defect constituted proximate cause of injury); E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 971 (Ala. 1985) (holding that seller's inadequate
warning could not constitute proximate cause of consumer's injury since consumer
failed to read warning); Kane v. R.D. Werner Co., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 37, 39 (III. App. Ct.
1995) (same); Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 850-51 (La. 1978) (same); Levin v.
Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 248 A.2d 151, 154 (Md. 1968) (plaintiff read, but ignored, in-
structions constituting negligence in failure to use reasonable care, barring him from
recovery). But see Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271, 280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)
(explaining that proof of failure to read warning not necessarily adequate to absolve
seller of liability); Bushong v. Garman Co., 843 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Ark. 1992) (stating
that "failure to read a label does not automatically preclude a claim for inadequate
warning."). Recovery is often precluded on both strict liability and negligence grounds.
However, "[flailure to read a warning does not bar recovery when the plaintiff is chal-
lenging the adequacy of the efforts of the manufacturer or seller to communicate the
dangers of the product to the buyer or user." Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and
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manufacturer of a machine intended for use by poorly-educated
industrial workers may be required to supplement its warnings
with symbols, tape-recordings, or periodic live demonstrations of
proper usage techniques whenever feasible.' Likewise, in a
state with a large Hispanic population, the highest court, legisla-
ture, or an appropriate regulatory agency might mandate that
certain product warnings appear in both Spanish and English.89
Manufacturers who failed to comply with these or other similar
requirements would not be permitted to avail themselves of the
comment j presumption.
Furthermore, Professor Latin's functional illeteracy argu-
ment proves too much. To some extent, all consumers are func-
tionally illiterate in the language of product warnings. This is
increasingly true as products become more sophisticated and
specialized." Applying Professor Latin's rationale, most product
warnings could be opposed on the grounds of efficiency since con-
sumers frequently encounter product dangers expressed in
technical language beyond their understanding. Furthermore,
since warnings increase the cost of products, if a significant
number of product users have difficulty comprehending a manu-
facturer's warning and if providing such cautions will not reduce
a seller's liability, the cost of these warnings may outweigh their
Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 284, 290 (11th Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir.
1965) (opining that manufacturer's warning may be inadequate since it lacked symbols
and foreseeable product users included people with "limited education and reading
ability"); Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 A.2d 305, 310 (N.J. 1984)
(explaining that symbols could be used in warning when foreseeable users included
unskilled and semi-skilled workers).
'9 But see Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 173-74 (Cal. 1993) (recognizing
that warning written in Spanish may have been appropriate since foreseeable product
users included Spanish speaking consumers, but holding that manufacturer did not
have legal obligation to include bilingual warning). Even in the absence of a legal obli-
gation, however, it may be a good business practice for a manufacturer to affix bilin-
gual labels and warnings on particular products as a way to attract and protect His-
panic and other non-English speaking consumers. The FDA has stated that it
"encourages the preparation of labeling to meet the needs of non-English speaking ...
populations." Id. at 173 (citing Labeling for Oral and Rectal Over-the-Counter Aspirin
and Aspirin-Containing Drug Products; Rye Syndrome Warning, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633,
21,633 (June 9, 1988)).
"' See, e.g., Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 412 N.E.2d 959, 961 (Il. 1980) (bulk
fertilizer spreader); Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 454 N.E.2d 64, 65 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983) (power lawnmower); Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615, 616 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (BB gun); Evridge v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 685 S.W.2d 632 (Tenn.
1985) (motorbikes).
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benefits for both the manufacturers and consumers.9
Legal ambivalence toward warnings is an extreme measure
and is unwarranted since a less drastic and equally effective al-
ternative exists. Rather than discounting the value of warnings,
functionally illiterate product users could be required to find a
literate person who will read and explain to them the product's
risks. Many areas of law either require those who are func-
tionally illiterate to seek help in reading and understanding
documents or simply presume their competence. In order to re-
ceive a driver's license, for example, an applicant must pass a
written test demonstrating knowledge of the rules of the road
and the ability to read and understand road signs.92 Similarly,
signing a contract, whether it is a lease or a credit card receipt,
affects the signatory's rights and duties, regardless of whether
that person fully understands the complex legalese contained in
the contract. 3 Rather than eviscerate contract law, it is less ex-
9' Even if only a subset of consumers can understand a certain warning, a manu-
facturer may still decide that such a warning should be provided. If more than a criti-
cal mass of consumers follows the warning, the manufacturer's liability expenses may
decrease more than the cost of producing the product rises. See Salvi v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., Inc., 489 N.E.2d 394, 397, 403 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (noting that manufac-
turer included warning on product for benefit of consumers outside class of typical
product purchasers in order to reduce liability).
Consumers may desire product warnings, even if they must pay extra for them,
to avoid the pain and suffering that inevitably accompanies product accidents. For
an argument that "leads to the conclusion that consumers likely do demand some
level of pain-and-suffering insurance," see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The
Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1791 (1995). Product liability rules are ultimately measured
against consumer preferences. Id. at 1792; see also Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at
254 (discussing study which indicated that consumers are attracted to products that
contain warning labels).
92 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-110(1)(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996);
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 502(4)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
9' See, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 279 F. 160, 162 (W.D. Tex. 1922)
(upholding surety obligation on bond by presuming illiterate signatory should have
bond read to him); Wasserbauer v. Marine Midland Bank-Rochester, 400 N.Y.S.2d
979, 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (stating illiterate signer's failure to procure reading of
instrument to him constituted gross negligence); see also 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts
§§ 225, 226 (1991) (stating that illiterate persons are presumed to know contents of
contract and are negligent for failing to have contract read to them). Courts in a
number of jurisdictions, however, have refused to apply this presumption to con-
tracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Wayman v. Amoco Oil Co., 923 F. Supp. 1322, 1342 (D.
Kan. 1996) (stating that exploitation of illiterate signatory is factor to be considered
in ascertaining whether contract is one of adhesion and suggesting that illiterates
are presumed to have such contracts read to them); Ponder v. Blue Cross of S. Cal.,
193 Cal. Rptr. 632, 640 (1983) (stating that words of adhesion contract must be un-
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pensive and more sensible to require functionally illiterate sig-
natories to obtain assistance in understanding the contract.94
The same principles of duty and presumed competence
should apply to product warnings. Functionally illiterate prod-
uct users who value their safety will learn the dangers of operat-
ing heavy equipment, mixing drugs, or using industrial cleaners
beforehand, even though the costs of learning this information
would be higher than the costs to literate users."'
2. Predictably Inattentive or Incompetent User Groups
Professor Latin next suggests a scenario in which consumers
"who are frequently inattentive, unable or unwilling to devote
the time and effort needed to read detailed warnings," such as
children and unskilled laborers, utilize various products.96 Such
product uses may be viewed as a specialized functional illiteracy
problem, since manufacturers of these products are aware that
their merchandise is especially likely to be used by people who
are unable to comprehend adequate warnings and should design
their products and accompanying warnings accordingly.
The BB gun is an example of a product designed primarily
for use by children that can cause serious injury if misused.97
derstandable to person of average education, knowledge, and experience).
See 17A All. JUR. 2D Contracts § 226 (1991). Of course, many people do not un-
derstand what they are signing. An MMVII adherent might argue that this conveys a
weakness in the proposed solution, but an RRC supporter can respond that a person
making an appropriate risk-benefit analysis can and should "sign away" and take his
chances. See Peter M. Kinkaid & William J. Stuntz, Note, Enforcing Waivers in Prod-
ucts Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1152 (1983) (asserting that enforcing product liabil-
ity waivers allows consumers who make informed purchasing decisions to allocate
their own level of liability).
" Some people may assume that certain usually-innocuous products, such as cos-
metics, do not pose a risk of harm. The single word "Warning," a symbolic exclamation
point, or other generally recognized warning indications can place consumers on notice
that they should obtain help in discovering the producfs dangers. See Dan Flynn, Let-
ter to the Editor, Reducing Choking Deaths in Children, 275 JAMA 1313, 1314 (1996)
(noting that warning packages on balloons, recommended by Balloon Council in 1991,
have reduced choking deaths among children from swallowing balloons).
Latin, supra note 13, at 1208.
o In Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, the court held that a fourteen-year-old boy pos-
sessed sufficient knowledge of a pump-up Air Rifle's lethal capacity to be civilly li-
able for injuring another teenager with the rifle, even though the rifle's warning la-
bel did not explicitly warn of such danger. Sherk, 450 A.2d 615, 617-18 (Pa. 1982).
Professor Latin criticized Sherk and other decisions dismissing design-defect actions
where child users failed to read or follow warning labels, arguing that such decisions
permit manufacturers to rely on "foreseeably ineffective warnings." Latin, supra
note 13, at 1268. Professor Latin argues that such reliance should not shield manu-
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How can sellers make these products safer, given children's
predictable inattentiveness? One possible solution is to address
warnings to both the children and their parents or guardians.
Another possible solution would be to allow manufacturers or the
government to prohibit retailers from selling the product directly
to minors.98
Either solution would ensure that, while children would be
the ultimate users of BB guns and other potentially dangerous
products, a parent or guardian would be burdened with the duty
of informing the child of the product's proper use and potential
dangers. If an accident occurs when the product is being used
improperly, the responsibility would rest on the shoulders of the
adult charged with conveying the warning to the child.99 This
solution resonates with familiarity. Parents and guardians al-
ready have across the board legal responsibility in negligence for
their children; the obligation to inform their children of the haz-
ards and proper safety procedures associated with products
would simply be a special case of this pre-existing duty.
00
facturers from judicial analysis regarding whether "reasonably equivalent product
substitutes can reduce the known risk to children." Id.
9' After a court, legislature, or regulatory agency implements such a prohibition,
several possible measures can help to ensure compliance. For example, police can con-
duct highly publicized crackdowns, such as those used to deter sales of tobacco, alcohol,
and pornography to minors. See, e.g., Terry Pristin, Enforcing Tobacco Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1996, at B1 (discussing training of health officials to conduct under-
cover "sting" operations to prevent sale of tobacco to minors); Susan Fraker et. al.,
Crackdown on Porn, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 1977, at 21, 22 (discussing legislative action
designed to reduce availability of pornography). Alternatively, retailers may be re-
quired to record the name and address of the purchasing adult for each unit sold; that
adult would then be responsible for the transmission of the warning to the child. Id. at
27.
A similar system of imputed duty would remedy the problem posed by Professor
Latin's example of the unskilled laborer. Rather than imputing responsibility to a par-
ent or guardian, the employer would be required to instruct its workers regarding a
product's warnings and to assume responsibility for the failure to adequately convey
such warnings. See Carol A. Cheney, Comment, Not Just for Doctors: Applying the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine to the Relationship Between Chemical Manufacturers,
Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 562, 563 (1991) (arguing that
"learned intermediary doctrine" should be applied in context of industrial employ-
ment).
The foreseeability of use by children may affect the manufacturer's duty to
warn of "open and obvious" dangers, see supra note 23, since "the determination of
what is open and obvious to children should be based upon what is true for children
as opposed to what is true for adults." Ken v. Asahi Pool, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1360,
1366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), appeal denied sub nom. Men v. Doughboy Recreational,
Inc., 649 N.E.2d 417 (IM. 1995).
" Parents and guardians must ensure that their wards do not place themselves in
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3. Reliance on Explanations by Intermediaries
While the proposed solutions to the previously discussed
problems necessitate the use of an intermediary, Professor Latin
views the closely related "learned intermediary" rule as a prob-
lem that itself contributes to the failure to read warnings."' Un-
der the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the chain of causation be-
tween the manufacturer's conduct and the final injury suffered
by the plaintiff may be interrupted or superseded when "an act
of a third person ... by its intervention prevents the [manu-
facturer] from being liable for harm.""
Professor Latin expresses concern that warnings transmit-
ted from doctors to patients, employers to employees, and sales-
danger, and must protect these wards once they are in a dangerous situation. If this
care is not taken, such negligence may be detrimental to the injured children's cases
against third parties, such as manufacturers. See, e.g., Townsend v. Wright, 469 S.E.2d
281 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 1996).
In Townsend, the defendant accidentally ran over a two-year-old girl who was
playing behind a parked car. Id. at 282. The girl's mother "sat under a tree in the
yard" while her two small children "played in the yard." Id. The Court of Appeals of
Georgia found the trial court's jury charge, that "it would be normally the duty of a
parent to see that the child would not be in a place of obvious danger," to be a cor-
rect "general statement of the duty of parents and other custodians of children." Id.
at 283. The court further stated that "[t]he most simple and direct statement of this
duty is that children of tender years and youthful persons generally are entitled to
care proportioned to their ability to foresee and avoid perils that they may encoun-
ter." Id.; see also Mayer v. Tulane Med. Ctr., 527 So. 2d 329, 332 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
("Parents are under a duty to properly supervise and protect their young children.
This duty is measured by a standard of what a reasonable parent would do under
the same or similar circumstances.") (citations omitted).
A parent's negligence may also lead to a lawsuit by the child against the parent.
See, e.g., Cates v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330, 335 (ll. App. Ct. 1992) (abolishing partial
parental tort immunity for injuries caused by negligent driving), affd, 619 N.E.2d
715 (ll1. 1993); Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391-92 (Ohio 1985) (holding fa-
ther liable to child for injuries suffered in utero which were proximately caused by
father's negligence); see also Geoffrey A. Vance, Rock-a-Bye Lawsuit: Can a Baby
Sue the Hand That Rocked the Cradle?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 429, 442-50 (1995)
(criticizing jurisdictions which have maintained parental tort immunity doctrine for
negligence actions). See generally Colleen M. Danaher, Cates v. Cates: Illinois'
"Solution" to Tort Litigation Between Parents and Children, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 607
(1994) (discussing erosion of parental immunity in Illinois and other jurisdictions).
1'0 Latin, supra note 13, at 1209-10. Professor Latin's "Reliance on Explanations by
Intermediaries" subsection is the fourth subsection in "Good" Warnings. It is dealt
with out of order here because of its close relationship to Professor Latin's first two
reasons why product users fail to read product warnings.
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). It is very difficult for a manu-
facturer to avail itself of this doctrine. "Proof of sufficiently intrusive third party con-
duct sufficient to break causation is a formidable task and [the manufacturer] must
show that the third party's conduct is itself the proximate cause of injury." Madden,
supra note 8, at 273.
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persons to buyers "may be incomplete, ambiguous, or obsolete,
and may underemphasize safety concerns to increase sales or
productivity."' 3 Reliance on a learned intermediary, however,
may actually enhance the transfer of information between a
manufacturer and a consumer."°4 A pharmaceutical company, for
example, can inform a physician who is "better trained to process
the risk information and convey the risks to [each individual]
patient" of the complex risks of certain drugs."5 Likewise, an
employer whose workers use industrial equipment for specific
purposes and who is familiar with the employees' cognitive
abilities can supplement general manufacturer warnings with
specific task-related information conveyed in a manner that is
more likely to be effective.'
As with any possible solution, reliance on learned interme-
diaries is imperfect. But the comment j presumption should not
yield merely because a learned intermediary, whether through
negligence or malice, misinforms a user. If the manufacturer
misinforms the learned intermediary, there is a clear justifica-
tion for discounting the shielding effect of the warning. If the
manufacturer does not supply misinformation, pallid support
exists for Professor Latin's attack on the comment j presump-
tion.
When information from an intermediary is the only warning
given to the user, the manufacturer has assumed the requisite
responsibility for its product by properly warning the intermedi-
ary, the person most likely to impart the message effectively to
the user. When an intermediary merely complements the
warning accompanying the particular product, there is even less
ground for discounting the warning's effect. A summary of the
1o' Latin, supra note 13, at 1209; see Madden, supra note 8, at 232 ("[Ilt is in the
professional user and the employer-purchaser jurisprudence that one still finds a high
incidence of retrogressive opinions defeating the recovery of injured parties whose su-
periors may have been informed of a product's risk, but who were, themselves, never
made aware of the danger.").
104 See Schwartz & Driver, supra note 66, at 68-72 (positing that employer can
provide most effective warnings orally by adapting message to individual employee's
needs and answering specific questions).105 viscussi, supra note 14, at 144.
10' See Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214-15 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that manu-
facturer had no further duty to warn product users who had experience and exper-
tise in handling and hazards associated with silica dust); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
661 P.2d 348, 365 (Kan. 1983) (affirming decision holding that manufacturer not
under duty to finish each employee with product manuals).
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warnings regarding a product provided by a learned intermedi-
ary is a supplement to, not a replacement for, reading the
warnings. This summary complements the manufacturer's
warning in much the same way as reading the "Cliffs Notes" to
War and Peace enhances one's understanding of the novel, with-
out substituting for the knowledge one acquires by reading the
novel.
After Professor Latin expresses his fears regarding learned
intermediaries and their failure to transmit effective warnings,
he concludes that "a blanket exemption from liability based on a
'good' warning to the intermediary is [not] appropriate when
manufacturers could make the product itself safer at a reason-
able cost.""7 The proper inquiry, however, is not whether the
product can be made safer at a reasonable cost, but whether
adequate warnings should exempt manufacturers from liability
even when producing safer products is economically feasible.
Even granting arguendo that the transformation of the learned
intermediary from the RRC's "Dr. Jekyll" to the MMI's "Mr.
Hyde" will transpire, an ineffective learned intermediary doc-
trine does not constitute a valid reason for dismantling the
comment j presumption. At best, it is evidence that doctors do
not always properly fulfill their duty to warn.
10 8
4. Misplaced or Unavailable Directions
Professor Latin further asserts that consumers sometimes
neglect to read product warnings because "instruction manuals,
tags, or package inserts ... can be detached and misplaced while
the product is still in use. '  This premise, however, does not
lead to Professor Latin's conclusion that a manufacturer should
not be entitled to presume its warnings will be heeded. In the
context of the workplace, it is far more sensible to suggest that
an employer who fails to provide proper training and instruc-
tions for its employees, including awareness of and access to the
warnings accompanying particular equipment, should be held
responsible for any resulting injury to such employees."0 Out-
107 Latin, supra note 13, at 1210 n.58.
... Even if one argued that the learned intermediary rule itself needs reform, this
neither effects warning law in cases where intermediaries are not present nor betrays
any inherent weakness in the comment j presumption.
"9 Latin, supra note 13, at 1208-1209.
" In most employment accidents covered by a workmen's compensation statute,
the employee relinquishes his or her common-law right to sue the employer for dam-
1996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:629
side the workplace, people who misplace warnings or purchase
products for which manuals or inserts are unavailable, are not
absolved of the responsibility of reading the manufacturer's
warnings."' If the product's original warnings are lost, or are
otherwise unavailable to a second-hand purchaser, this pur-
chaser may allocate the risk in several ways. He could lower the
purchase price, buy the item from a seller who has the warnings,
buy the product and obtain the manual independently, or not
buy the product at all."'
When the original purchaser continues to use a product after
losing the original warnings, the most efficient way to reduce
accident costs is to require the consumer to obtain a new copy of
the warnings. A liability-wary manufacturer should happily
provide them. If the consumer conducts a cost-benefit analysis
and determines that procuring replacement warnings is an ex-
cessively burdensome task, he may choose to rely on his memory
of the warnings, or to improvise when his memory fails. The
wisdom of these choices varies according to each product's inher-
ently dangerous characteristics, the strength of the consumer's
memory, and his or her skill in using the product."
ages in return for modest, but assured, benefits. See, e.g., N.Y. WORtl COMP. LAW § 53
(McKinney 1996); Curtis v. GSX Corp., 774 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. 1989). While imper-
fect, this arrangement "is intended as a just settlement of a difficult problem," and
strikes a compromise between the interests of fairness, compensation, and certainty.
New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1917). Although the injured
worker,
is no longer able to recover as much as before in case of being injured
through the employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensa-
tion in all cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the
difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of
the damages.
Id. at 201.
11' See Barry v. Eckhardt Porsche Audi, Inc., 578 P.2d 1195, 1195 (Okla. 1978)
(holding that seller of used auto did not have duty to warn of inoperative seat belt
buzzer).
"1 The likelihood of such behavior is roughly related to the complexity and dan-
gers posed by the product. For example, a purchaser is more likely to haggle over a
missing automobile manual than a toaster manual. Cases in which purchasers do not
account for missing manuals, therefore, are likely to involve products which are the
least likely to result in serious harm. See Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 254.
" See id. (suggesting that consumers evaluate extent to which ensuring safety
requires expenditures of time and money). A reasonable conclusion is that consum-
ers make decisions consistent with "safety-related knowledge" when the perceived
hazard is severe and the action to ensure safety requires little effort. Id.
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5. Reliance on General Knowledge and Expertise
Professor Latin also examines situations where consumers
simply ignore available product warnings and rely solely on their
past experience and knowledge. In support of his argument, Pro-
fessor Latin cites a study'I in which all one hundred participants
who were "asked to complete a simple construction project" failed
to read or acknowledge the warning on hammers provided to
them before beginning their assigned task."5
The authors of the study concluded that there is "no way of
knowing what percentage of product users actually read the
warning label or even recognize that one exists, but casual ob-
servation suggests that the figure may not be high."16 Professor
Latin adds that "it is doubtful that most consumers will read de-
tailed warnings and directions accompanying hammers, aspirin,
bicycles, light bulbs, detergents, and many other products that
are in widespread use.""7
114 Latin, supra note 13, at 1210.
1s See Alan L. Dorris & Jerry L. Purswell, Warnings and Human Behavior: Impli-
cations for the Design of Product Warnings, 1 J. PROD. LIAB. 255 (1977). This study re-
quired one hundred high school and college students to perform a simple construction
project which consisted of making a "starter hold." Id. at 256-57. The participants re-
ceived hammers to which three alternative warnings were affixed. Id. One of the
warnings, (a), had been present on the hammer when it was purchased, while the
other two warnings were created solely for the purposes of this study. Id. The three
labels read:
(a) Caution! A hammer can be made to chip if struck against another
hammer face or another hardened surface resulting not only in damage to
the hammer but possibly in bodily injury.
(b) Caution! Do not proceed further. Ask for instruction before you continue
this operation. It is important that you do not use this hammer to strike.
(c) Caution! Do not proceed further.
Dorris & Purswell, supra at 256-57.
At the completion of the task, the researchers asked the participants if the
hammers contained warning labels. None of the one hundred participants recalled
noticing a warning label. Id. Davis and Purswell suggested that these results may
be a function of the artificial atmosphere in which the experiment was conducted,
but expressed doubt that the results would be different in a non-controlled envi-
ronment. Id. The authors stated that the experiment suggested that the wording of
a warning label does not decrease the possibility of product related injuries since
few users read the warning. Id.
Professor Latin suggested that this study was plausible and agreed that, while
this conclusion may not apply to all products in all circumstances, the majority of
consumers fail to read warnings affixed to common products in widespread use.
Latin, supra note 13, at 1210.
116 Dorris & Purswell, supra note 115, at 256.
117 Latin, supra note 13, at 1210; see also Dorris & Purswell, supra note 115, at 259
("The extent of the perceived hazard is undoubtedly influenced by past experience with
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It seems quite sensible, however, for consumers who have
been riding bicycles, changing light bulbs, using laundry deter-
gent, and hammering nails for years not to reread the warnings
for these products every time they handle them."S When prod-
ucts are relatively simple and commonplace, consumers are pre-
sumably aware of the minimal dangers these products present,
and it may not be worth even the small amount of effort needed
to constantly re-inform themselves of these warnings."9 When
dealing with complex or dangerous products, such as drugs, it is
reasonable to assume that users will be less likely to ignore
"good" warnings and rely instead on their general knowledge of
the product's proper use. 2'
Professor Latin's position becomes more untenable when,
despite adequate warnings and instructions, a court finds
"blatant and massive misuse" 21 of a product by a user who "[did
not] pay any attention to whether it had instructions or not" be-
cause "[h]e figured [he] knew what [he] was doing." 22 If one
views such consumer behavior as irresponsible, or simply inap-
propriate, relieving manufacturers of liability is beneficial since
it will encourage consumers to read warnings. In products liabil-
ity cases, the deterrent effect of tort law is most often addressed
by encouraging manufacturers to take desirable precautions in
the product.")
'1 See Dorris & Purswell, supra note 115, at 259. Researchers have found that
consumers are reluctant to accept warnings regarding natural disasters. Id. Dorris
& Purswell suggest that this reluctance extends to warnings about common prod-
ucts. Id. Professor Latin posits that consumers rely upon prior knowledge and past
experiences with common products and assume that they already know the requi-
site safety procedures. Latin, supra note 13, at 1210-11. Professor Latin contends
that this presumed knowledge causes overconfidence and extends the failure to read
product warnings into other fields. Id. at 1211.
19 Professor Latin's empirical claim that product users do not always re-check
warnings on innocuous products does not lend support to his argument. Deciding not
to re-check warnings on innocuous products is classic RRC behavior that allows prod-
uct users to save time without incurring a substantial probability of injury. See supra
notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing RRC paradigm).
120 See Dorris & Purswell, supra note 115, at 259 (asserting that individuals re-
spond to warnings according to their beliefs and attitudes towards hazard, product,
and warning).
'21 Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 361 (Kan. 1983).
122 Id. at 362. Several courts have held that "a plaintiff who does not read an alleg-
edly inadequate warning cannot maintain a negligent-failure-to-adequately-warn ac-
tion unless the nature of the alleged inadequacy is such that it prevents him from
reading it." E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 971 (Ala. 1985); see also
Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 956 F.2d 1319, 1329 (6th Cir. 1992); Kane v. R.D. Werner
Co., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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designing and producing their products." The concept of deter-
rence, however, can also be analyzed from the perspective of the
consumer. If consumers are aware that they must bear their
accident costs when they ignore good warnings, they will think
twice about ignoring warnings. Just as fear of tort costs can
drive manufacturers to provide adequate warnings, fear of ab-
sorbing accident costs can encourage consumers to read them."
6. Information Overload
Professor Latin next discusses the "debate in the social sci-
ences literature about whether extended descriptions of product
attributes will induce information overload."" He presents the
common argument that detailed product warnings may be as
problematic as uninformative warnings because consumers will
be selective in which information they read,"6 and excessive in-
formation increases the difficulty of selecting which information
to heed, increasing the probability of consumer inattention to
warnings.
127
The first reply to this argument is that, as Professor Latin
admits, there is a debate in the literature over whether consum-
ers can appropriately process warnings." As a matter of com-
'2 See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1982) (holding manu-
facturer had duty to produce "state-of-the art" design, rather than merely complying
with industry standards, since increased burden on manufacturer was reasonable in
light of severity and probability of injury).
, Although this only partially contradicts Professor Latin's argument regard-
ing consumer inadvertence, deterrence is possible where a consumer consciously
decides to ignore warnings and rely on his general knowledge and experience. See
Dorris & Purswell, supra note 115, at 263 (stating that further research should be
conducted in order to determine common fears of hazards to make warnings more
effective); see also Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 226-27 (suggesting that further
research in area of warning effectiveness will benefit consumers). Professors Lehto
and Miller believe that the existing research indicates an increased tendency in con-
sumers to act in accordance with warnings that they deem credible. Id. at 255. This
perceived tendency suggests that deterrence may be achieved by increasing the
credibility and effectiveness of warnings. Id.
'2 Latin, supra note 13, at 1211. For another discussion on the debate over in-
formation overload effects, see Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 222-23.
1' Latin, supra note 13, at 1211.
u7 Id. This is especially problematic, according to Lehto & Miller, since "[iun re-
sponse to [the] proliferation of litigation based upon the duty to warn, many manu-
facturers have both increased and made more explicit the warning labels they pro-
vide with their products .... Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 225.
="[1The information overload idea as commonly expressed rests on questionable
experiments that their principal investigator now cautions decisionmakers not to take
literally." David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analy-
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mon sense, one can assume that a 500-page warning booklet ac-
companying a toaster will be very lonely. It is harder to draw
firm conclusions when we move into the more empirically impor-
tant gray area. One prominent article concludes that "legal
implications of the information overload phenomenon ... must be
rejected because consumers in fact do not 'overload.' "" Instead,
when too much strain is placed upon a consumer's cognitive ca-
pacities, experimental evidence shows that the consumer
"satisfices": he "do[es] as well as one can, given the circum-
stances."3 ' Since people decide matters in ways that further
their own best interests when they satisfice, "the best inference
from the evidence is that consumers do not experience serious
problems as a result of the amount of information that markets
and the state now generate."
131
A plethora of evidence shows that, in general, "consumers
respond appropriately to the provision of safety information."
32
This is partially due to the nature of product use: safe handling
techniques are often "common knowledge or easily learned."'33 It
is precisely when a consumer is unfamiliar with a product's
proper use or inherent dangers that he is more likely to be wary
and eager to consult the product's warnings.
Professor Latin concludes that "[gliven the asymmetry in
product safety information and risk-assessment expertise, the
concept of information overload in a meaningful sense-too much
information can interfere with the efficiency of consumer
choices-should be treated as relevant, not irrelevant, to the le-
gal imposition of responsibilities for prevention of product-
related accidents."'34 Given the uncertainty in the social science
literature, and that the amount of detail in a warning deter-
mines its legal adequacy,' it is equally plausible to conclude
sis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L REV. 277, 280 (1986).
'2 Id. at 279. Stated more strongly, the authors' conclusion is that "the informa-
tion overload idea-that too much information causes dysfunction-is a myth." Id. at
301.
130 Id. at 279.
13 Id. at 294. For another criticism of the "information overload" idea, see Hager,
supra note 24, at 1146 ("For all its increasingly frequent invocation, the overload ar-
gument has scant empirical or theoretical substantiation.").
" Schwartz, supra note 8, at 398.
13 Id.
134 Latin, supra note 13, at 1215.
' See David E. Kanouse & Barbara Hayes-Roth, Cognitive Considerations in
the Design of Product Warnings, in 6 BRANBURY REPORT: PRODUCT LABELING AND
HEALTH RISKS 147, 153 (1980).
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that "typical general warnings and category instructions are
adequate, subject to particular contrary evidence." 36
7. Competing Demands on Time and Attention
Professor Latin concludes the section on the failure of con-
sumers to read product warnings by elaborating on the
"information overload" theme.'37 While warnings themselves
may be too long or complex for consumers to process, these con-
sumers must contend with numerous other distractions. Since
our "decisionmaking capacities are limited and ... people have
many competing demands made on their time and attention," it
is foreseeable that some people will not read certain product
warnings."' Professor Latin discusses two inapposite cases to
illustrate the supposed tendency of product users "to ignore
warnings associated with common household products in order
to conserve time and attention."39 These cases fail to exemplify
a situation in which competing demands on consumers' attention
diverted them from heeding warnings. Instead, they exhibit con-
sumers' failures to heed simple, clear warnings. In one case, the
only "distraction" was a deceptive product name," ° while the only
apparent competing demand on the user's attention in the other
case was attractive packaging.'
In Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 4 the plaintiff was injured
after ignoring the following warning on a rug cleaner: "Caution.
Do not inhale fumes. Use only in well ventilated place."' The
logo "Safety-Kleen" was in large type on all four sides of the
product's can, while the warning appeared in smaller type on
two sides of the can. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a
judgment for the plaintiff, stating that the product's name,
Safety-Kleen, "would naturally lull the user of that fluid so-
n3 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 398.
37 See Latin, supra note 13, at 1215-20.
"'s Id at 1216; see also Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 230 ("Humans selectively
attend to information, ignoring what they consider to be irrelevant. A major difficulty
in designing an effective warning label is to design it so that it will not be filtered
out.").
'9 Latin, supra note 13, at 1216-17.
4 Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 41 A.2d 850 (Pa. 1945).
1 Brown v. Gulf Oil Corp., [1984-85 Transfer Binder) Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) I
10,474, at 27,837 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1985).
42 41 A.2d 850 (Pa. 1945).
' Maize, 41 A.2d at 851.
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named into a false sense of security."' Since the product's name
"was so prominently featured" on its packaging, the court found
it to be understandable that some consumers would discount the
ventilation warning as being "of comparatively minor import." 4'
The court thus concluded that the manufacturer negligently de-
signed the product's warning label.'46
While supporting the court's decision, Professor Latin
"take[s] exception ... to the court's emphasis on the name of the
cleaner," since "[m]any people will assume a product intended for
home use is sufficiently safe that they need not examine detailed
warnings."14 7  However, Safety-Kleen's spartan warning could
hardly be considered "detailed." In addition, it is thoroughly ab-
surd for a consumer to assume that he does not have to read a
product warning merely because that product is "intended for
home use." Prescription medication, microwave ovens, lawn-
mowers, chain saws, blenders, and weightlifting equipment are
all intended for home use, but there is no justification for ignor-
ing warnings on these products.'48
It is equally difficult to comprehend how Brown v. Gulf Oil
Corporation4' illustrates the proposition that "increasing
amounts of consumer time and attention" are spent reading
warning labels."' The warning was simple and direct:
CAUTION:
Flammable if overheated or exposed to open flame. Always
melt Gulfwax by heating in a pan over boiling water, as in a
double boiler. Never melt directly in pan over fire, hot plate
or in hot oven.'51
The wax caught fire while being heated in a saucepan and
burned Mrs. Brown and her husband while they attempted to
discard the pan. Mrs. Brown "assumed there was no danger ...
'44 Id. at 852.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 853.
147 Latin, supra note 13, at 1217.
148 See, e.g., Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 783 (N.D. Ind.
1969) (stating that safety warning regarding use of lawn mower discharged duty to
warn); Dixon v. Jacobson Mfg. Co., 637 A.2d 915, 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994) (holding that plaintiff assumed risk by disregarding warning on snowblower);
Davis v. Berwind Corp., 640 A.2d 1289, 1296-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (blender).
1 [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 10,474, at 27,837 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 1985).
"0 Latin, supra note 13 at 1215.
151 Brown, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) $10,474 at 27,838.
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because the wax was beautifully packaged which made the prod-
uct appear innocuous."15 The Tennessee Court of Appeals re-
jected the plaintiffs' attempt to analogize their case to Maize,
holding that "the cases are distinguishable in that the Gulfwax
package makes no explicit representation of safety. A picture of
candles, fruits, and a candy jar on the package is illustrative of
the uses of the product, not of its safety.""3
Furthermore, a Gulfwax user would be more likely than the
average product user to read the warning because of its position-
ing on the package. The cautionary message was printed on the
bottom panel of the package, along with information about
"General Uses" and "Preserving and Canning." 6" Since no other
instructions or directions appeared on the package, "anyone
wanting any information on the product would have to see this
panel."5 Instead of acknowledging that this unfortunate con-
sumer suffered injury because of her own carelessness, or advo-
cating the mandatory placement of warnings on the front of all
packages,' Professor Latin attempts to buttress his argument
with an unsubstantiated criticism of Tennessee's duty to inspect
packages.
Professor Latin relies upon the decisions in Maize and Gulf
Oil to support his argument that some users may not read
warnings. Professor Latin concludes that "[wihether or not ideal
consumers 'should' examine all warnings and directions, the
caselaw provides empirical support for the conclusion that prod-
uct users frequently do not read them."'57 While Professor Latin
provides anecdotal evidence of careless consumers, such evidence
fails to support his conclusion that users "frequently" fail to read
product warnings, either in an absolute sense or as a percentage
112 Id. at 27,838.
1'3 Id. at 127,845.
'u Id.
15 Id.
126 The prominence of the warning and the manufacturer's marketing techniques,
both at issue in Gulf Oil, are two factors a court must consider in evaluating the ade-
quacy of a warning. See infra notes 297-313 and accompanying text. These factors may
also render a productes advertising or packaging misleading and possibly subject the
manufacturer to penalties imposed by the Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug
Administration, or various consumer protection laws. See 21 U.S.C. §352 (Supp. 1996)
(requiring drug and medical device manufacturers to provide "adequate warnings ...
where [the produce's] use may be dangerous to health ... in such manner and form as
are necessary for the protection of users").
57 Latin, supra note 13, at 1219.
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of all consumer interactions with products. Furthermore, the
reality that some consumers will fail to read warnings and that
some products will cause harm does not diminish the legal im-
portance of warnings. To analogize, the fact that many people
will negligently cause harm to others does not justify abandoning
a negligence standard and leaving the cost of losses with victims.
Similarly, the failure of many drivers to obey posted speed lim-
its, whether they carelessly fail to read the speed limit sign, have
competing demands on their time and attention, or for any other
reason, does not justify abating police enforcement of traffic
laws.
B. Failure to Understand "Good" Warnings
Professor Latin's next argument is that, even if a product
user reads a warning, he may not understand it. Professor Latin
anticipates that juries will engage in Monday-morning quarter-
backing by "overestimat[ing] a typical user's degree of compre-
hension," resulting in inadequate awards that fail to compensate
fairly product injury victims.158 Many of the arguments Professor
Latin makes in this section of "Good" Warnings speak to the is-
sue of what warnings should be considered legally adequate to
qualify as a warning under comment j. These concerns could be
addressed in an equally effective manner by setting a high stan-
dard for what counts as a "good" warning.5 9
1. Inability of Manufacturers to Design Clear and
Comprehensive Product Warnings
Professor Latin first asserts that consumers fail to under-
stand good warnings because, while "[m]any risks are complex
and cannot be explained in simple terms," verbosity may
"decrease the clarity or impact" of warnings.6 ' In other words, if
warnings are too brief, they may omit important information,
while if they are prolix, their tedium will bore consumers into
danger. Sellers face a "catch-22" situation that constrains them
from placing the judicious amount of information in a warning
"' Latin, supra note 13, at 1220. But cf Schwartz, supra note 8, at 398 ("[T]he
commitment of juries to the compensation goal suggests that ... the fear that consum-
ers would bear excessive accident costs in a world where adequate warnings are excul-
patory seems unwarranted.").
"9 See infra notes 297-313 and accompanying text.
"0 Latin, supra note 13, at 1221.
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since "[n]o tradeoff among clarity, comprehensiveness, and im-
pact can prove optimum for all warning contexts and product us-
ers."161  This is merely an extension of Professor Latin's
"information overload" argument: complexity reduces consumers'
ability to read or comprehend warnings, while oversimplification
dilutes the messages contained in warnings.
162
In support of his argument, Professor Latin cites a study
comparing the effects of differing amounts of detail in drug
warnings. The study concluded that "the short version [of the
test warning] may have been more successful at conveying fairly
simple facts, whereas the longer version may have been more
successful at communicating complex information requiring in-
tegration."163 This study simply reaffirms the common-sensical
proposition that the length of a warning must correspond to the
nature and complexity of its message. The drafters of the Re-
statement stress that a manufacturer must consider the effects of
length on clarity when drafting a warning.' It is unimportant
that no individual warning may be perfect; the objective should
be to design warnings that are understood well enough to pre-
vent frequent injury. This is an empirical question that cannot
be answered with simple laboratory experiments and anecdotal
evidence.
It is interesting that Professor Latin chooses the example of
drug warnings to illustrate the proposition that there is an in-
herent tension between the desire for brevity and the necessity
of comprehensiveness. First, it is inherently more difficult to
achieve a "safer design" for drugs than for most other products.
While there may be many alternative ways to design and posi-
tion a gas tank on a car, or to place a hand guard on a printing
press, a new prescription drug is usually the product of years of
research and testing, and the consumer must often risk side ef-
fects or other dangers in order to attain the drug's benefit. 65
Second, the range of possible warnings that can accompany
drugs seems rather limited: a patient may need to take the drug
'6' Id. at 1222; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT § 2 cmt. h ("Warnings that
are too numerous or detailed may be ignored and thus ineffective.").
16C2 See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
163 Kanouse & Hayes-Roth, supra note 135, at 151.
' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT § 2 cmt. h.
See Carlin v. Superior Ct., 920 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Cal. 1996) (stating that li-
ability of manufacturers must be limited to encourage research and development of
new products).
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at specific times; there may be contraindications; and there may
be side effects.'66 Such warnings will rarely generate internecine
battles between detail, clarity, and impact. Third, warnings on
prescription drugs are often directed at the doctors who pre-
scribe the drugs, rather than the patients. This complicates Pro-
fessor Latin's warning analysis by introducing learned interme-
diary doctrine issues, such as a doctor's duty to warn.'67
2. Textual Ambiguity
Professor Latin next addresses the "textual ambiguity" that
allegedly infects "[s]tatements of any significant complexity.""
The main causes of nebulosity in product warnings, Professor
Latin asserts, are vague terminology and oxymoronic messages
"declaring that the product is desirable, efficacious, and safe for
use, but also hazardous and subject to misuse." 9 The problem of
ambiguity is compounded, according to Professor Latin, when
consumers fail to recognize that ambiguity exists."o
Professor Latin illustrates the problem of textual ambiguity
by discussing the case of Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Com-
pany v. Langley.'7' In this case, the plaintiff, Mrs. Langley, lost
some of her hair after applying one of the defendant's "New Milk
Wave Lilt Home Permanent" kits.'7 2 The plaintiff alleged that
Procter & Gamble impliedly warranted that the product "was
wholesome and noninjurious and did not contain any harmful
substance."7 ' The following directions accompanied the solution:
BEFORE YOU START
Remember - you shouldn't use any permanent, unless your
hair is in good condition. So, a few reminders ...
'66 Most users of prescription drugs lack scientific training, and do not need to
know the underlying scientific reasons for the danger that the drug poses. The warn-
ing must simply state the drug's dangers, how to avoid those dangers, and possible re-
sults of noncompliance with the warning. See Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 171.
... See Torsiello v. Whitehall Lab., 398 A.2d 132, 139-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979) (discussing physician's duty to warn); see supra notes 101-108 and accompanying
text.
168 Latin, supra note 13, at 1222.
169 Id.
" Id. at 1223 ("Consumers may not recognize ambiguity in warnings before an
accident occurs and courts may underestimate the ambiguity after subsequent
events have clarified product risks and appropriate preventive measures.").
'7' 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); see Latin, supra note 13, at 1223.




3. If your hair is bleached, tinted or color-treated in any
way or if it is in delicate condition (dry, brittle, breaking off,
etc.) make test curls to see if your hair can take a wave.... If
at any time, these strands feel sticky or gummy, use the
liquid neutralizer at once and do not wave any more of your
hair.
174
The plaintiff testified that she read this warning and
"understood that the instruction and warning in regard to the
strands of hair being sticky meant 'Just what it says.' ,171 Since
her hair had recently been tinted, Mrs. Langley made a test curl,
but left the lotion on for four minutes as opposed to the recom-
mended ten. At this time, the test curl was sticky. Instead of
using the liquid neutralizer as the directions required, however,
she applied the solution to all of her hair. She further exacer-
bated the situation by leaving the preparation in for twice the
amount of time specified in the instructions.176
Professor Latin's use of Langley as an example of textual
ambiguity is not persuasive. When the Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals stated that the product's "instructions and warnings are
unambiguous and explicit,"'77 it was not simply engaging in pre-
tentious overestimation of a consumer's ability to comprehend
the warning, for "Mrs. Langley herself testified that she read the
instructions and warnings and understood them to mean just
what they say."'78 Professor Latin's assessment that the warn-
ings were textually ambiguous is not only in direct contradiction
to the findings of the court, but also to Mrs. Langley's express
acknowledgment of the warning's clarity. Professor Latin's con-
clusion, therefore, can be sustained only if he knows Mrs. Lan-
gley's true understanding better than Mrs. Langley herself.
Professor Latin stresses that there "is nothing inherently
uncomfortable or threatening in the sensation of stickiness and
the test curl felt no different from the product itself before the
application." '79 These facts, however, are irrelevant to the issue
of the ambiguity of the product's warning. There is nothing
"inherently uncomfortable" in many potentially dangerous ac-
tions that manufacturers typically warn against, such as swal-
174 Id. at 775.
175 Id.
IN Id.
177 Langley, 422 S.W.2d at 780.
178 Id.
179 Latin, supra note 13, at 1224.
1996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
lowing a massive overdose of powerful medication, or placing
one's hand in dangerous proximity to the moving blades of a
blender. The way the product felt before the test curl is irrele-
vant since that simply "is not the test."'80
At most, Langley merely presents an issue of the effective-
ness of the warnings which accompanied the home permanent
kit. A potentially viable challenge to the warning in Langley is
that it is "more likely that [Mrs. Langley] did not really under-
stand the significance of the sticky condition or the possibility
that disfigurement, rather than unsatisfactory hair styling, could
result from product use."'' This criticism anticipates the next
subsection of "Good" Warnings.
3. Uncertainty About the Consequences of Misuse
Professor Latin next addresses the uncertainty of consumers
regarding the consequences of product misuse.' 2 Placing this
discussion under the larger category of "failure to understand
'good' warnings" is odd, since Professor Latin does not claim that
the users misunderstood the warnings. Rather, the warnings at
issue inadequately disclosed the potential harms or risks associ-
ated with product misuse. A warning that contains incompre-
hensible language or is buried within the fine print cannot fully
alert users to a product's risks. Similarly, a warning that fails to
disclose the possible harm that can result from product misuse
may not impress upon the user the necessity of following product
instructions.
Professor Latin cites Cooley v. Carter-Wallace, Inc."8 3 to illus-
trate this proposition. Rather than supporting his position, this
case demonstrates that his criticism would be more appropri-
180 Langley, 422 S.W.2d at 780. The court stated that the tactile sensations of the
product before application were irrelevant since the directions specifically required the
user to evaluate the sensation after application to the test curl. Id.
181 Latin, supra note 13, at 1225. Professor Latin suggests that a secondary source
of textual ambiguity is product advertising. "A message declaring that the product is
desirable, efficacious, and safe for use, but also hazardous and subject to misuse, may
confuse potential buyers." Id. at 1222. This statement is patronizing and borders on
implausibility. Most consumers understand that if they use a lawnmower correctly
there will not be a problem, but it is potentially dangerous if someone sticks a hand
underneath the carriage while the motor is on, or runs the lawnmower over a bed of
rocks. See Stovall & Co. v. Tate, 184 S.E.2d 834, 835 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (stating that
all parties knew that lawn mowers throw pebbles).
182 Latin, supra note 13, at 1225.
183 478 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
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ately directed at the standard for what constitutes a "good"
warning. Indeed, the "precise question" on appeal in Cooley was
"the adequacy of the warning" on a container of Nair depilatory
cream."M While the package clearly warned against application of
the cream to "vaginal/genital areas," the plaintiff applied Nair to
his scrotal area before undergoing a vasectomy and developed a
severe infection."5 The only mention of the potential conse-
quences of misuse contained on the product was that "[i]rritation
or allergic reaction may occur with some people."'86
A warning's sufficiency "is dependent upon both the lan-
guage used and the impression that the language is calculated to
make upon the mind of the average user of the product."' 87 Since
the warning on Nair "was such that a prospective user could
fairly assume that any possible adverse effect of the product
would be mild, whereas the product was actually capable of pro-
ducing serious and permanent injury," the court held that the
warning was inadequate."
Professor Latin correctly states that consumers cannot
"make 'rational' risk calculations if they are not aware of the
stakes."189 However, he draws two erroneous conclusions: first,
that this negatively implicates comment j; and second, that if
provided with only a partial list of potential harms, users "may
not understand the risks created by any deviation from the
specified directions.""' The evidence that consumers disadvan-
tage themselves by miscalculating risks is weak. 91 And not only
is it impossible for a manufacturer to anticipate every potential
misuse of its product, it is also impossible to predict every harm
"4 Id. at 376.
1& Id.
le Id.
Id. at 378 (citation omitted).
'8 Cooley, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
" Latin, supra note 13, at 1226.
'o Id.
11 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 413. Some of the studies which Schwartz cites show
that:
housing prices correctly reflected earthquake risks ... [and] the probability
of defects ...[;] consumers have a substantial willingness to pay to reduce
the injury rate from common household products such as drain openers
...[;] workers appreciate risks to life and health and exact substantial wage
premiums for bearing them ... [; and] consumers routinely purchase ex-
tended warranty coverage when buying expensive items such as cars and
computers.
Id. at 379 (citations omitted).
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that might occur from such misuse. The existence of these diffi-
culties does not compel abandoning the requirement of adequate
product warnings. A potential user can make an informed deci-
sion about whether to purchase the product and whether to heed
the warning as long as the warning mentions the most severe,
and the most common, risks.192
4. Inadequate Evaluative Expertise
Professor Latin's next subsection, premised on the proposi-
tion that consumers "may not grasp the meaning of product
warnings because they lack the necessary education and evalua-
tive skills," largely rehashes his discussions of functional illiter-
acy and predictably incompetent user groups.'93 One can concede
that "people with higher education levels tend to consider more
information and derive more meaning from it"'94 and still believe
that a manufacturer's warning need only be adequate for a rea-
sonable person. The fact that a consumer simply cannot under-
stand a particularly complex warning because his education falls
below that of a reasonable person does not render the warning
inadequate; the user must find someone to explain it to him.'
An expectation of reasonableness on the part of actors,
whether or not it is attainable in a particular case, is in accord
with many other areas of tort law. For example, under the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, "[miental deficiency which falls
short of insanity ... does not excuse conduct which is otherwise
contributory negligence."'96  The establishment of standards
based upon the elusive "reasonable person" resonates in practi-
cality, since "[i]f the rule were otherwise, there would be a differ-
ent standard for each level of intelligence resulting in confusion
192 See Gurley v. American Honda Motor Co., 505 So. 2d 358, 361 (Ala. 1987)
(stating that warning need only be reasonable under circumstances to be legally
adequate); see also Pfizer v. Jones, 272 S.E.2d 43, 44-45 (Va. 1980) (holding that
warnings need not include exhaustive list of potential dangers); Barry v. Don Hall
Lab., 642 P.2d 685, 689 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that manufacturer does not have
to warn of "all attendant risks").
13 Latin, supra note 13, at 1226; see supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
"4 Latin, supra note 13, at 1226.
" See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text. If warnings are not accessible
to some people, Professor Latin's argument is not devoid of reason. However, this Ar-
ticle develops an equally effective counter-argument in order to minimize the force of
Professor Latin's assertion and to demonstrate that Professor Latin's argument is a
critique not only of comment j, but of other universally accepted areas of tort law.
'6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 cmt. g (1965).
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and uncertainty in the law."197
5. Individual Variations in Capabilities, Motivations, and
Beliefs
The next subsection, in which Professor Latin asserts that
"decision-making capacities and proclivities vary greatly among
different people and in different settings,"198 simply reiterates the
arguments made in the previous subsection of "Good" Warnings.
Professor Latin concludes that "inadequate evaluative expertise"
and "varied educational and experiential backgrounds among
product users ensure that the level of their understandings of
warnings will also vary widely."99 Rather than recognizing that
a well-designed warning will effectively alert most consumers to
the dangers of a product, Professor Latin proposes a standard
under which every warning is bound to be inadequate."' While
acknowledging that "increased uniformity in warning terminol-
ogy may well be desirable," he rejects proposals for standardiza-
tion because "no warning can be perfectly effective given wide
variations in human decisionmaking competency and personality
traits."0 ' Taking Professor Latin's argument to its logical ex-
treme, the words "no legal doctrine" must be substituted for the
words "no warning," because the disparate backgrounds, per-
sonality traits and ability levels that prevent perfect compre-
hension of warnings also confound the ability of actors to behave
non-negligently, or to conform to the strictures of the criminal
'9' Wright v. Tate, 156 S.E.2d 562, 565 (Va. 1967) (holding mentally incompetent
adult to same standard of care as person of greater intellect); see also Jolley v. Powell,
299 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (applying reasonable person standard to
insane tortfeasor). "It is surely not unusual in tort law nor indeed is it unfair that per-
sons may be held responsible for failing to live up to a standard which, as a matter of
fact, they cannot meet." Id. at 648; see OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMiON LAW 108
(1881) ("The standards of the law are standards of general application .... It does not
attempt to see men as God sees them, for more than one sufficient reason .... [The
awkward man's] slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang
from guilty neglect.").
In actions for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, courts have
based decisions on whether the reaction was appropriate based upon the expecta-
tion of an "ordinary objective consumer," not whether the individual consumer is
particularly squeamish. See Phillips v. Town of West Springfield, 540 N.E.2d 1331,
1333 (Mass. 1989) (addressing whether ordinary consumer could expect to find bone
shard in cafeteria food).
11' Latin, supra note 13, at 1227.
"9 Id.
211 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
.21 Latin, supra note 13, at 1229.
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law.
Professor Latin's concerns raise questions about how promi-
nent cognitive disparities will be for most product warnings.
Will the fact that "human behavior is characterized by diversity
and change, ' mean that some people, or the same people over a
period of time, will be unable to resist using electric equipment
in the bathtub, or is there only a danger at the margins, when
consumers tangle with complex products created for specialized
uses? As long as the warning is clear, the former does not seem
plausible, while the latter does not seem empirically worrisome:
a first-time user of a complex product is likely to be alert and
cognizant of warnings, while a long-time user has experience on
his side.
Just as Professor Latin's concerns should not be read to
emolish all of tort, contract, and criminal law, neither should
they be casually dismissed. Research concerning the interrela-
tion between a person's behavior, perception, and subsequent
understanding may be used as an important tool to construct
and judge legally adequate warnings. In utilizing this knowl-
edge, both manufacturers and courts will have the opportunity to
"give adequate consideration to the multiplicity of factors that
affect user comprehension of product risks and warnings.""3
6. Cognitive Heuristics and Biases
Professor Latin next provides a lengthy discussion of the
"fertile area of psychological research" known as cognitive heu-
ristics. 4 Cognitive heuristics are the simplifying strategies
people adopt to process complex information."°5 Professor Latin
argues that cognitive heuristics are one of the reasons why indi-
viduals vary in capability or belief, or why some consumers may




200 Heuristics are ways of reasoning that quickly produce an acceptable, but im-
perfect, result. They arise from the need to reduce difficult and prolonged thought,
and allow the decisionmaker to develop "tricks" by which decisions can be made
rapidly. STUART SUTHERLAND, IRRATIONALITY: WHY WE DON'T THINK STRAIGHT 320
(1992); see also Allen Newell, The Heuristics of George Palaya and Its Relation to
Artificial Intelligence, in METHODS OF HEURISTIcS 195 (Rudolf Gromer et al. eds.,
1983).
206 Latin, supra note 13, at 1229-30.
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The first heuristic Professor Latin discusses is
"representativeness," which "reflects the tendency of people to
make improper probability estimates because they generalize
from inadequate samples or superficial analogies."0 7 Professor
Latin fears that users may rely on their limited, uneventful ex-
periences with a particular product, or all products in general, to
conclude that a particular product is safe.0 8 Placed in socio-
scientific terms, Professor Latin's concern is: "When consumers
use particular products without injury, the 'input' in their as-
sessment of product safety-these safe experiences-will lead to
an expected 'outcome' of continued safety."0 9
Professor Latin's fear that repeated safe product uses will
lull consumers into complacency is exaggerated. The safety of
each product use is not completely independent and unrelated to
that of its previous uses. If a particular product is not improp-
erly designed or manufactured, and the consumer has used the
product safely in the past, he will likely continue to use it safely
in the future. In other words, a person who has used a product
competently and safely usually should expect that his future ex-
perience with the product will be safe. Unless a product's safety
quickly deteriorates with age, the danger level associated with
its usage will be relatively constant. The belief that
"representative" safe experiences while following a product's
warnings will later lead users wantonly to ignore those warnings
is untenable.210
The second heuristic Professor Latin discusses is that of
"availability," which posits that since "safe experiences with vir-
tually all products are far more frequent than injuries ...[,] the
great majority of product risks cannot be available to product us-
2017 Id. at 1230. A person who follows the representativeness heuristic "evaluates
the probability of an uncertain event or a sample, by the degree to which it is: (i) simi-
lar in essential properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features
of the process by which it is generated." Daniel Kahneman & Amos Twersky, Subjec-
tive Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 32, 33 (1982).
211 See Latin, supra note 13, at 1230-31.
2 Id. at 1232.
210 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1439 (1983). Consumers know that the design and manufacture of appliances
may be affected by human error. Id. Since numerous product successes would imply
a forthcoming failure, the representativeness heuristic biases users towards pessi-
mism, making it unlikely that users will wantonly ignore warnings. Id. at 1440.
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ers. "211 While common product risks, such as "adverse reactions
to cosmetics and drugs, [or] falls from ladders,"212 are not widely
publicized, Professor Latin fails to establish a causal connection
between this lack of publicity and a tendency to ignore good
warnings. 213 He ignores powerful reminders of potential product
problems, such as safety recalls, large monetary judgments, con-
sumer safety groups, and the experiences of acquaintances. Fi-
nally, he also overlooks the most obvious source of "availability"
of danger: the warning itself. A product's warning is associated
specifically with the particular product, not with a general risk
of product accidents. A product warning can be more powerful
than a newspaper account of product injury since the latter may
simply blend into normal tragic incidents reported by the news-
paper, while the former is in propinquity with the product.
"Cognitive dissonance," the next heuristic that Professor
Latin discusses, "leads people to reject or underemphasize in-
formation inconsistent with their beliefs and actions."214 A per-
son who admires a Corvette's pulchritude and speed, posits Pro-
fessor Latin, may undervalue its potentially dangerous nature."'
It is precisely the purpose of a warning, however, to provide the
"reality check" that consumers need when they are entranced by
a product's attributes. While attending to warnings may
dampen a consumer's initial euphoria, there is no reason to be-
lieve that adhering to warnings by wearing seat belts or main-
taining properly inflated tires will cause users to "minimize the
significance" of these hazards or reduce the usefulness of the
211 Latin, supra note 13, at 1234.
212 Id. at 1233; see David W. Bates, et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and
Potential Adverse Drug Events: Implications for Prevention, 274 JAMA 29 (1995)
(listing 180,000 deaths and over 1 million injuries each year from adverse drug re-
actions); Patricia Braus, Who's Crashing and Smashing, AM. DEMOGRAPHIcs, Oct.
1, 1995, at 16 (stating that there were 7.7 million hospital visits in 1994 due to
tripping and falling from ladders and steps); Home Accident Figures Remain High,
PRESSWIRE, May 19, 1995, at M2 (reporting approximately 42,000 accidents annu-
ally involving ladders); Patricia McCormick, Allergic Reactions? Check Your Cosmet-
ics, THE RECORD, Dec. 13, 1984, at B7 (noting that FDA received 247 complaints in
1982 regarding skin problems caused by cosmetic use).
213 Latin, supra note 13, at 1233.
214 Id. at 1234. In Professor Latin's view, positive attributes of a product may cause
consumers to ignore negative attributes, resulting in cognitive dissonance affecting
product selection. See id.
215 Id. "Framing" refers to the phenomenon whereby individuals respond in
"unexpected" ways to information depending upon its presentation. Id. at 1235.
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product.216 Furthermore, it strains credulity to anticipate that a
person could purchase a product such as an automobile without
realizing that it is potentially dangerous, and be dumbfounded
and heartbroken after discovering the contents of its warnings.
Professor Latin next considers the heuristics of "framing"
and "anchoring," which emphasize the relationship between the
presentation of information and the recipient's subsequent reac-
tion.217 These heuristics are based upon the premise that ma-
nipulation of statistics and verbalizations affect the way indi-
viduals perceive risk. For example, consumers may be risk-
averse if information is presented in terms of "potential lives
saved," but risk-seeking if it is presented in terms of "potential
lives lost," despite the lack of probabilistic reason to differentiate
between these statistics."' Consumers may also "anchor" esti-
mates of probability on initial statistics regarding the frequency
of occurrences that they receive. Test subjects who are furnished
with different "anchors" may estimate product risks differ-
ently.
219
Professor Latin does not demonstrate how these heuristics
affect a product user's ability to follow and comprehend warn-
ings; instead, he utilizes them to question how "the RRC as-
sumption that people make 'rational' choices in pursuit of per-
sonal preferences [can] be taken seriously .... As for framing,
it is difficult to imagine a product warning's impact changing
significantly by replacing "Do Not Expose to Fire" with "Keep
Away from Open Flame." Assuming this change dilapidates the
warning's effectiveness, the warning will be legally inadequate,
and comment j will not apply. In addition, if adroit framing
makes advertising or product packaging misleading, the warning
2'6 Latin, supra note 13, at 1235; see also Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risks, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 463, 464-655 (1982) (describing inherently subjective nature of risk assessment
and difficulties encountered by consumers in evaluating risks). Contrary to Professor
Latin's view, studies indicate that "availability" causes people to judge an event as
"nlikely or frequent if instances of it are easy to imagine or recalL" Id. at 465.
217 Latin, supra note 13, at 1235-38.
218 See, e.g., Amos Twersky & Daniel Kalneman, Rational Choice and the Framing
of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY 25 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Twersky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
219 See Slovic et al., supra note 216, at 466-67.
2 Latin, supra note 13, at 1236-37.
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may not satisfy the requirements of consumer protection laws.22 '
One response to the anchoring heuristic is that it is not in-
herently "irrational" to base one's estimates on an anchor. In the
example Professor Latin cites, experiment subjects differed in
their estimates of forty mortality risks depending upon whether
they were initially told that 50,000 people per year die in auto-
mobile accidents, or that electrocution kills 1,000 people per
2221ti nyear. It is unlikely that most people would know the number
of people who suffer lethal injuries each year. If the mortality
rate of automobile accidents, fairly high, or electrocution, fairly
low, is the only information available, it is thoroughly rational to
use this limited data to help estimate other mortality risks.'
While not ideal, it is still the best information the consumer pos-
sesses.
In addition, product warnings generally do not require the
user to apply cognitive reasoning skills in contrived settings.
They simply alert users to the risks of particular products; a
comparative analysis of risks across products is not necessary. A
crane operator who wishes to avoid electrocution will attempt to
ensure that his crane rig avoids high voltage power lines." The
operator's estimate of the frequency of electrocution does not af-
fect his behavior.
Finally, Professor Latin discusses "prospect theory," which
integrates several cognitive heuristics, including framing and
anchoring.225 According to a study by Professors Kahneman and
Twersky, users undervalue probabilistic insurance.26 Professor
Latin assumes that the "same reasoning would likely apply to
22' Deceptive advertising practices are forbidden under federal law. See 15 U.S.C. §
45 (Supp. 1996); 15 U.S.C. § 52 (Supp. 1996). See generally Bruce I. McDaniel, Anno-
tation, What Constitutes "False Advertising" of Drugs or Devices within §§ 5 and 12 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§45, 52), 49 A-L.R. FED. 16 (1980).
222 See Latin, supra note 13, at 1237; see also Slovic et al., supra note 216, at 466-
67.
2n See SUTHERLAND, supra note 205, at 200; Slovic et al., supra note 216, at
478.
22 See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934 (N.M. 1977) (construction worker
electrocuted when crane contacted high voltage power lines), overruled by Kloop v.
Wackenhut Corp., 824 P.2d 293 (N.M. 1992).
"' See Latin, supra note 13, at 1238-39.
26 "[Pleople greatly undervalue a reduction in the probability of a hazard in com-
parison to the complete elimination of that hazard .... [P]robabilistic insurance repre-
sents many forms of protective action, such as having a medical checkup, buying new




any precautionary aspect of a product warning that does not en-
able the consumer to eliminate product risks." 7 The example
Professor Latin provides is that "a risk reduction from 40% to
30% may not be perceived as equal in value to a reduction from
30% to 20%, although the objective benefits and costs of mar-
ginal prevention may be identical . Professor Latin's mis-
giving may be misplaced since it is unclear that any existing, or
realistically possible, warning will alert users to specific prob-
abilities of risk reduction. A casual inspection of product warn-
ings shows that the line between risk-reduction and risk-
elimination is blurred; little information is given on the effec-
tiveness of following warnings, or the statistically probable re-
sults of noncompliance. 9 The norm is simply "Warning: do not
do X." To imply that product users nevertheless calculate per-
centages of risk-reduction is to imbue them with the mental
abilities at which the rest of "Good" Warnings scoffs. Even when
a product warning is of the format "To reduce the probability of
Y, do not do X," consumers who wish to avoid result Y will avoid
doing X.' 0
C. Failure to Follow "Good" Warnings
Even if a consumer reads and understands a warning, Pro-
fessor Latin argues, he may still not heed the warning "for sev-
eral reasons that are inconsistent with the RRC model."2 3'
227 Latin, supra note 13, at 1239 n.202.
"' Id. at 1239 n.203.
22" See, e.g., Hager, supra note 24, at 1151-52 (refuting common presumption
that warnings alter behavior and prevent harm); Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at
226-28 (analyzing inherent difficulties in designing warning labels caused by human
limitations).
2" This Article omits a discussion of "Competing Demands on Time and Atten-
tion," the final subsection in "Good" Warnings. That subsection is largely a redux of the
subsection of the same name appearing under reasons why people fail to read product
warnings. See supra notes 84-156 and accompanying text.
231 Latin, supra note 13, at 1242; see also Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 245 ("It
is often assumed, quite naively we believe, that a comprehended warning message will
be heeded. This assumption is unfortunate, because many additional factors compli-
cate the transition between understanding what should be done and actually behaving
safely. Among these factors, aspects of memory and decision making play an important
role.") While Lehto & Miller concede that "little research is available that evaluates the
capabilities of warning labels to encourage people to select appropriate responses,"
they extrapolate from studies evaluating safety education programs and safety propa-
ganda, which they claim have been "limited in their success." Id. at 248-49.
While Professors Latin, Lehto, and Miller emphasize an anti-plaintiff role, Pro-
fessors Henderson and Twersky argue that, presuming a product user followed a
1996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:629
1. Imperfect Memory
Professor Latin first submits that a person may fail to ad-
here to a comprehended warning because "hnuman memory is in-
herently limited and imperfect."2 2 Although there is little re-
search that documents consumers' abilities to retain information
they have read on warning labels, the general proposition about
the fallibility of memory can be readily granted.233  Still it is
misleading to say that "[i]nformation is unlikely to prevent acci-
dents caused by forgetfulness or inattention," 234 since the precise
virtue of supplying written warnings and instructions is to fill
the lacunae left by failed memories. If, to borrow Professor
Latin's example, "users of cosmetics and hair care products ...
forget how long the applications should last,"25 they can simply
reread the applicable warnings. Even if the consumer has dis-
carded the warning, a mere phone call or an additional trip to
the beauty parlor will usually resolve any uncertainty. On the
other hand, where a user purposely chooses to ignore warnings
in order to "conserve time and effort, "216 he has taken a calcu-
lated risk for which the odds vary with the quality of the risk
good warning, "a mirror image of a presumption that defendants enjoy under com-
ment j," benefits plaintiffs. Specifically, this presumption eases the plaintiffs' bur-
den on the issue of causation:
To establish causation a plaintiff should, in theory, be required to prove not
only that she would have read, understood, and remembered the warning,
but also that she would have altered her conduct to avoid the injury. How
is the plaintiff to carry these burdens? ... A plaintiff typically can offer lit-
tle more than self-serving testimony and anecdotal evidence to establish
her proximate causation case.
Henderson & Twersky, supra note 9, at 278, 305. If courts strictly applied a causation
analysis, plaintiffs would be unable to prevail. Thus, "plaintiffs causation case is made
excessively easy because any other reaction would make the case unacceptably diffi-
cult." Id. at 306; see also Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 198 (3rd Cir. 1984)
("[T]he evidence must be such as to support a reasonable inference, rather than a
guess, that the existence of an adequate warning may have prevented the accident be-
fore the issue of causation may be submitted to the jury."); Coffman v. Keene Corp.,
628 A.2d 710, 718 (N.J. 1993) ("Although empirical evidence may not demonstrate the
soundness of a heeding presumption, an examination of the strong and consistent
public policies that have shaped our laws governing strict products liability demon-
strates the justification for such a presumption.").
22 Latin, supra note 13, at 1242.
21 See Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 247. One study found that less than 10%
of antacid purchasers recalled any portion of the product's warning label. Id. Analo-
gous studies measured the ability to recall propaganda posters, traffic safety posters,
and traffic signs, and all reported dismal results. Id.




taker's memory. Such risk-taking is paradigmatic RRC behav-
ior.
237
Professor Latin discusses Conti v. Ford Motor Company.8 to
illustrate his contention. Mrs. Conti suffered an injury while en-
tering a car her husband had started without first disengaging
the clutch.239 The Third Circuit found it to be "clear from the rec-
ord that Mr. Conti was not paying attention to what he was do-
ing when he started the car," and that a jury could reasonably
infer that warnings in addition to those already in the operator's
manual would not have helped him. 4° Ford could not have pre-
vented the manual transmission car from rolling when started in
this manner, and a fortiori could not have done so at a reason-
able cost.24' Assuming that Professor Latin agrees that all man-
ual transmission cars are not ipso facto defectively designed,
that they roll when started with the clutch engaged, and that
Ford adequately warned of this danger in its operator's manual,
only Mr. Conti could have prevented this accident. While the oc-
currence of the accident is unfortunate, there is no logical justifi-
cation in Conti for expunging comment j.
2. Overconfidence
Another reason consumers fail to follow good warnings, ac-
cording to Professor Latin, is that they may be "unduly optimis-
tic about their ability to avoid [the] hazards" enumerated in
warnings."' Professor Latin cites social science research which
implies that people "may disregard some risks if they believe
careful behavior will prevent accidents and they consider them-
selves unusually capable and careful."243 The validity of the data
which supports this conclusion is suspect for two reasons. "First,
decision strategies that are inappropriate to laboratory settings
often could be appropriate in real life. Second, the tasks people
27 Id. at 1199-1206; see supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing
RRCparadigm).
743 F.2d 195 (3rd Cir. 1984).
2" Id. at 196-97.
210 Id. at 198.
241 The jury rejected the plaintiffs' design defect claim but found Ford liable on the
failure to warn allegation. Id. at 197.
242 Latin, supra note 13, at 1243.
243 Id. at 1243-44; see also Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 231 ("Experienced us-
ers might be more prone to ignore warning-related information because of past, benign
experience, in which accidents rarely occur.").
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are assigned in laboratories sometimes seem too artificial to
support a strong inference that persons routinely misperform
important tasks in their actual lives."244 In fact strong data dem-
onstrate the opposite of Professor Latin's conclusion: the salience
of strongly-worded warnings is likely to stand out in consumers'
minds, which necessarily implies that "consumers will attach
disproportionate weight to negative data, and thus overreact to
product-related risks."245
Product users who ignore warnings because they "think they
are better than average drivers" fail to take advantage of an ef-
ficient, effective safety device.246 The very purpose of a warning
is to alert the user to a risk inherent in the use of the product,
and thus allow the consumer either to forego purchasing the
product or to use it without incident. 7 It is the consumer's pre-
rogative to be unjustifiably overconfident, to attend only "to
warning labels placed on products perceived as being danger-
ous,"248 just as the consumer may use a product without reading
the warning. Consumers could "rationally choose not to use
particular kinds of protective equipment if they felt it was too
burdensome to do so."249 For example, consumers who forego
wearing gloves every time they use Drano because they find the
use of gloves to be more costly than the expected injury costs be-
have rationally, even if the product warns that gloves should be
worn.
250
If society determines that in some cases individuals should
be required to follow certain precautions, society can regulate
product use and ensure that these precautions are adopted.
Should users neglect warnings and subsequently suffer injuries,
there is no moral or logical imperative militating that comment j
must be abandoned in order to compensate them for their risk-
taking behavior. The only reason to eviscerate comment j would
be a belief that accident victims should not bear any responsibil-
244 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 380.
243 Id. at 381.
246 Latin, supra note 13, at 1244; see also Baruch Fischhoff, Cognitive Liabilities
and Product Liability, 1 J. PROD. LIAB 207, 212 (1977) ("[Seventy-five to ninety per-
cent] of drivers believe that they are better than the average.").
27 See Wiseman v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 7 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Minn. 1943) ("The
purpose of a warning is to apprise a party of the existence of danger of which he is
not aware to enable him to protect himself against it.").
248 Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 232.
249 VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 137.
2'0 See id. at 138-39.
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ity for accidents." 1 This belief contravenes the "main message of
hazard warnings," which is "that safety is a joint responsibility,
not simply a responsibility of producers."2
3. Reflexive Actions During Emergencies
The next reason Professor Latin proffers for the failure of
consumers to follow good warnings is that "[pleople [I do not fol-
low safety instructions when they must respond rapidly or even
instinctively to emergency circumstances."2 3 The two categories
of examples set forth by Professor Latin, however, provide un-
convincing support for the proposition that the comment j pre-
sumption is an unrealistic legal fiction.
Professor Latin's first example is the situation where at-
tempts are made by "machine tool operators ... to clear obstruc-
tions or correct other problems without first shutting down the
equipment as the directions required."" In support of this ex-
ample, he cites Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company255
which examined the adequacy of the manufacturer's warning
and the employer's instructions. In Campos, the plaintiff was
injured while reaching into a protective cage in the course of as-
sembling a tire.258 The plaintiff had received written and oral in-
structions warning against doing this, and had been involved in
a similar accident six years earlier."7 The most prominent issues
raised on appeal were whether the defendant had a duty to warn
of an obvious danger and, more importantly, whether the
"defendant should have produced a graphic or symbolic warning
against inserting one's hand in the protective cage during the
inflation process."258 In determining the adequacy of the warn-
ings, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that symbols may
have been appropriate since a large portion of the class of fore-
seeable users could not read English.259 The court remanded the
22 Latin, supra note 13, at 1197 (stating that "the commentj presumption imposes
losses on accident victims whenever users do not obey 'good' warnings.").
252 VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 156.
253 Latin, supra note 13, at 1244.
2 Id.
2' 485 A.2d 305, 308 (N.J. 1984).
26 Id. at 307.2'5 Id. at 307-08.
28 Id. at 308.
2' Campos, 485 A.2d at 310. There was a chart on the wall of the workplace
warning workers to inflate tires in safety cages. Id. at 307. The plaintiff "received
some oral instructions from his supervisor," who knew that the plaintiffs first lan-
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case for a new trial, reasoning that the plaintiffs failure to com-
prehend the warning rebutted the presumption of his contribu-
tory negligence."'
The tendency of drivers to "exceed the safe-handling toler-
ances of their vehicles" during "traffic emergencies" is the second
example of reflexive action introduced by Professor Latin."1 Pro-
fessor Latin fails to cite a case in which a motor vehicle manu-
facturer defended a product liability case resulting from a traffic
emergency on the ground that the driver failed to read and heed
a warning during the emergency. Indeed, it is misleading for
Professor Latin to state that drivers "frequently do not follow"
warnings under emergency circumstances.22 It is difficult to
imagine that the presence or lack of an adequate warning, as op-
posed to a manufacturing or design defect, would constitute a
central issue in such cases. When a traffic emergency arises, it
is unlikely that a warning applies since a manufacturer cannot
warn drivers against unpredictable, exigent driving situations.263
Thus, the comment j presumption is largely irrelevant to driving
emergencies. Insofar as someone can be said to "ignore" a
warning while responding to an emergency situation, it is be-
cause that person engages in prototypical RRC behavior by de-
ciding that the emergency response supersedes the warning.2"
4. Disregard of Low-Probability Risks
Professor Latin next cites two social science studies, one of
which indicates "that people often ignore low-probability
risks,"265 and a contrary study indicating "that people often exag-
guage was Portuguese, and that he was illiterate in English. Id. at 307-08.
60 Id. at 312. Professor Latin also cites Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571
(N.Y. 1976), in which a worker was injured while operating dangerous machinery. Al-
though the adequacy of the warning was not at issue, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that "legal responsibility, if any, for injury caused by machinery which has
possible dangers incident to its use should be shouldered by the one in the best posi-
tion to have eliminated those dangers." Id. at 578. However, "[tlhis does not compel a
manufacturer to clothe himself in the garb of an insurer in his dealings." Id.
261 Latin, supra note 13, at 1244.
262 Id.
26 The manufacturer can, however, warn against placing oneself in a situation
likely to become an emergency. For example, an automobile manufacturer can warn
drivers never to drive on snowy or icy roads without snow tires.
64 See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) ("[A]
warning is not effective in eliminating injuries to instinctual reactions....").
265 Latin, supra note 13, at 1245.
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gerate the significance of low-probability risks."2 66  Professor
Latin, in attempting to draw a lucid conclusion from these con-
tradictory studies, 67 states that:
[Riequiring safer product designs instead of exclusive reliance
on 'good' warnings would be desirable unless (a) people pay
careful attention to low-probability risks in the majority of
product-use contexts and (b) manufacturers and courts can
identify the accident contexts where this pattern prevails. 8
Given the state of uncertainty of the research, Professor
Latin cleverly selects unrealistic prerequisites for maintaining
comment j. The conditions imposed by Professor Latin are vir-
tually unobtainable, and largely irrelevant, since comment j and
consumers' possible tendency to ignore low-probability risks are
not incompatible. Two social scientists, Kunreuther and Slovic,
indicate that many low-probability threats must be ignored or
else individuals "would become so burdened that any sort of pro-
ductive life would become impossible."269  Although consumers
are forced into being selective about which risks they choose to
ignore, this does not compel reducing reliance on a system of
warnings. First, a good warning allows users to determine the
degree of risk and adjust their activity levels accordingly. 20 Sec-
ond, the fact that a warning highlights a danger increases the
danger's salience and decreases the tendency to disregard it.
271
Third, even a rational consumer's decision to ignore low-proba-
2 ' Id. at 1246; see W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS 109 (1992) (noting that con-
sumers may overestimate risk of low probability events).
2,7 In an attempt to justify the inconsistent results reached by social scientists,
Professor Latin notes that "[one explanation for the disparity between experimental
evidence that low-probability risks are overweighted and observations that people of-
ten ignore these risks is that experimental methodology forces high salience for the
risks under study while 'real life' experiences seldom make low-probability risks avail-
able." Latin, supra note 13, at 1246.278 Id. at 1247.
20 Latin, supra note 13, at 1245 n.230 (citing Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic,
Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 64, 67 (1978)
(analyzing test subjects' risk assessments in controlled study)); see also Croley & Han-
son, supra note 91, at 1847-48 (discussing Professor Latin's reliance on Kunreuther &
Slovic study).
270 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. h (noting that adequate warn-
ings direct user's attention to potential risks and allow users to adjust their conduct
appropriately); see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 396 (noting that warnings indi-
cate risk levels and provide proper method of product use).
271 See generally Dorris & Purswell, supra note 115, at 258-59 (stating that ten-
dency of individual to respond to warning is affected by person's assessment of haz-
ard, language of warning, and source of warning).
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bility risks is a gamble. Consumers exhibit varying levels of risk
aversion and choose to ignore different risks regardless of the
adequacy of the warning.
For example, even if we adopt Professor Latin's suggestion
that adhering to the warnings on lawnmowers is a Herculean
task, 72 consumers will nevertheless make their own judgments
regarding the utility of adhering to the warnings, in effect per-
forming their own Judge Learned Hand test.273 When an ade-
quate warning provides users with risk assessment information,
including the intensity of the product's risks and how to avoid
them, a consumer's choice to disregard the warning does not
render the warning ineffective. 4
5. Lack of Manufacturer Credibility
Professor Latin's final argument posits that "[c]onsumers
sometimes fail to follow product warnings because they do not
find the disclosures credible."275 Professor Latin rhetorically asks
whether "manufacturers really believe people normally follow
these warnings or [whether] their main objective [is] to limit po-
tential liability?"276 The answer, despite Professor Latin's false
dichotomy, is both. While manufacturers certainly aim to limit
their liability, it is usually reasonable for them to assume that
users follow the provided warnings.277
In Temple v. Velcro USA, Inc.,278 cited by Professor Latin, a
272 In light of the repetitive and time-consuming nature of the lawn mowing
task, the inconvenience of stopping and restarting the engine, the numbers
of passersby who might temporarily move into proximity, the difficulty of
locating small objects in the grass, the ignorance of most consumers about
how far various objects might be propelled, and the likelihood that previ-
ous safe usage could create a false sense of security, it would be unrealistic
to expect all users to comply with the burdensome safety instructions.
Latin, supra note 13, at 1261 (commenting on Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 454
N.E.2d 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
273 See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 385-86 (discussing Judge Learned Hand's bal-
ancing test).
274 See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 721 (N.J. 1993) (noting that "[tihe
relevance of the [user's] conduct on the issue of proximate causation necessarily
implicates the issue of contributory negligence").
27' Latin, supra note 13, at 1247.
276 Id.
277 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) ("Where warning is
given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded...."); see
Coffman, 628 A.2d at 718 (recognizing that implicit in duty to warn is presumption
that warnings will be heeded).
278 196 Cal. Rptr. 531, 532 (Ct. App. 1983).
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consumer disregarded an emphatic warning based on the mis-
conception that it was merely a legal disclaimer. The plaintiff
sued Velcro for the wrongful death of her husband, who died in a
balloon crash when a Velcro closure holding the balloon's defla-
tion panels gave way. 9 When Velcro learned that its product
was being used to secure balloon deflation panels, it repeatedly,
though unsuccessfully, attempted to persuade the F.A.A. "to is-
sue an airworthiness directive forbidding the use of its closures
in deflation panels of hot air balloons."280 Velcro then issued a
severe warning to all known owners of balloons that utilized Vel-
cro, including the plaintiff.281 The main issue on appeal was the
adequacy of the warning."' The appellate court a ed the
granting of summary judgment in favor of Velcro, stating that
the "warning was very clear, understandable and completely un-
ambiguous" and acknowledging that Velcro exhausted all rea-
sonable options under the circumstances." 3 Professor Latin con-
cedes that a warning "might have been the best action available
after Velcro's manufacturer discovered the hazards of this type
of use," but highlights the technical and legal terminology scat-
270 Id. at 531.
2 Id. at 531-32. In general, "a manufacturer is required only to produce a product
that is reasonably safe for its intended use." Madden, supra note 8, at 259. "When the
misuse of the product is of such a nature as to have been not reasonably foreseeable,
the paramount logic of the rule of law precluding a plaintiffs recovery ... is that the
manufacturer is not required to produce a product that is wholly incapable of injuring
the user." Id. at 266-67.
2" The warning stated, in part:
WARNING - EXTREME DANGER ... VELCRO closure has not been de-
signed and is not proper for use to secure the deflation panels in hot air
balloons. Any balloon which uses VELCRO closure for this purpose is un-
safe because the deflation panel is subject to unintentional opening which
could result in untimely and rapid deflation, uncontrollable descent and
serious injury or death to those using the balloon. You should not fly any
hot air balloon unless and until it has been retrofitted with a design of de-
flation panel which does not employ VELCRO closure .... DO NOT FLY
ANY HOT AIR BALLOON WHICH USES VELCRO CLOSURE TO
MAINTAIN THE DEFLATION PANEL IN PLACE .... INDIVIDUALS
WHO IGNORE THIS WARNING DO SO AT THEIR OWN RISK AND
MAY SUFFER SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH .... The use of VELCRO
closure in this manner is extremely dangerous, and you must not fly any
hot air balloon under any circumstances unless and until it has been retro-
fitted with a deflation panel which does not employ or rely on VELCRO
closure to hold it in place.
Temple, 196 Cal. Rpt. at 534 (emphasis in original).
2 Id. at 533.
283 id.
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tered throughout the warning. 8' Given the extreme danger cre-
ated by the product's misuse and the emphatic, compelling
warning received by the plaintiffs husband, Temple should be
viewed as a desperate attempt by the plaintiff to obtain some
consolation for her tragic loss rather than a "lack of manufac-
turer credibility."
IV. A RIPER TARGET FOR "GOOD" WARNINGS: INCOHERENT
JUDICIAL TREATMENTS
In "Good" Warnings, Howard Latin mounts a formidable
challenge to the effectiveness of warnings and the comment j
presumption. While this Article seeks to repel Professor Latin's
onslaught, it does not attempt to defend the current regime of
warning law. A survey of relevant caselaw reveals that the cur-
rent cryptic judicial standards in warning cases further compli-
cate a complex area of the law and fails to serve both manufac-
turers and consumers. 85 They also allow critics of comment j to
conflate the issues of warning adequacy with the legal effect of
warnings, and to win sympathy by juxtaposing the imbroglio of
warning law and the pronounced human suffering caused by
product-related accidents.
A. The Current Judicial Confusion
An additional, unintended irony exists in Professor Latin's
use of quotation marks around "good" whenever it modifies
"warning." While Professor Latin's ostensible task is to demon-
strate that warnings often prove ineffective, much of his criti-
284 Latin, supra note 13, at 1248. For example, in explaining the dangers of using
Velcro in deflation panels, Velcro USA specifically warned all known balloon owners
utilizing their product that "the VELCRO closure seams are subjected to circumferen-
tial and meridional stresses which were heretofore unknown and unexpected and have
not been accounted for in the design of your hot air balloon." Temple, 196 Cal. Rpt. at
533-34. The warning also stated that "VELCRO USA INC. MAKES AND HAS MADE
NO WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OR SAFETY OF VELCRO CLOSURE IN THIS
USE AND IT EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES, INCLUDING,
WITHOUT LIMITATION, IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE." Id. at 533.
285 Compare Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 A.2d 305, 310 (N.J.
1984) (stating that warnings in form of symbols may be appropriate where foresee-
able class of users is illiterate) with Uptain v. Huntington Lab., Inc., 685 P.2d 218,
220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (declaring written product warnings may be adequate),
affd, 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986).
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cism and analysis of pro-defendant decisions would be more
properly directed at the need to establish clear standards for de-
termining what constitutes a "good" warning. For example, in
Richards v. Upjohn Company,"' a manufacturer discovered that
a drug that had been used topically for over a decade had a
greater potential for causing irreversible deafness than scientists
originally believed.287 In subsequent editions of the Physician's
Desk Reference ("PDR"), Upjohn reflected this perceived increase
in danger by indicating that "the drug was for intramuscular use
only." 8 Given that the drug had been used topically for more
than a decade before Upjohn withdrew its recommendation to
use it this way, and it was not common for practicing physicians
to consult the PDR every time they administer a drug, the ade-
quacy of a warning usually "is a question of fact to be determined
by a jury."2 9  Since the effectiveness of Upjohn's new warning
was disputed, it is startling that the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant without advising the appellate
court of its reasoning."' The trial court merely stated that "there
remains no genuine issue of material fact,"291 despite Court of
Appeals Judge Sutin's observation that "summary judgment has
never been upheld in a case of such complexity."92
Another example of judicial ineffectiveness in a warning
case is Uptain v. Huntington Laboratories, Inc.293 The plaintiff, a
hospital housekeeper, suffered severe chemical burns her third
day on the job after she wrung out a swab covered with "Sani-
Tate" cleaning compoundY.2 4 The Sani-Tate bottle was conspicu-
ously labeled as a poison and contained a specific admonition re-
garding the possibility of chemical burns.
295
2" Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
2s Id. at 1194.
289 Id.
2' Id. at 1195.
2" Richards, 625 P.2d at 1196.2"1 Id. at 1195.
22 Id. at 1198.
23 685 P.2d 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), aff/d, 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986).
2" Id. at 219.
2" Id. at 220.
The front side ... carries the word "poison" in large red letters on a white
background between two skull and cross-bones logos. Beneath the word
"poison," again in large letters, is "Danger; keep out of reach of children."
Beneath this, in small letters, is stated, "Read carefully additional caution-
ary and first aid statements on back." On the back, again in smaller let-
ters, is a paragraph labeled "precautions" which reads: "Danger: Corrosive.
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The Colorado Court of Appeals, in affirming a jury verdict
for the defendant, proffered a vague and ineffectual standard for
adjudicating the adequacy of warnings: "A warning is adequate
if, considering the character of the product, one may conclude
that it reasonably informs the user of the scope of the danger in-
volved."" 6 These vague criteria do not assist in determining the
adequacy of the Sani-Tate warnings. For example, the front of
the bottle cautioned that the product was poisonous and unsafe
for use by children.297 Considering that Sani-Tate is an indus-
trial strength toilet bowl cleanser, the chances of accidental in-
gestion or use by a child are slim. The possibility that it might
come into contact with a worker's hands, however, is signifi-
cant.298 The fact that Sani-Tate's labels warned of various haz-
ards does not answer the critical question in the case: whether
the phrase "Produces chemical burns" printed on the back of the
bottle, in conjunction with the general warnings on the front of
the bottle, combine to make the entire warning adequate.
B. The Need to Clarify the Criteria that Make Warnings Legally
Adequate
The current, convoluted judicial approach towards a manu-
facturer's duty to warn has led to inconsistent protection for con-
sumers and inadequate protection from liability for manufactur-
ers who are "Ir]equired to provide product warnings, but [are]
furnished neither with practical limitations on the kinds of risks
that they must mention nor with any useful prescription for a
properly drafted warning."299 The failure to consistently apply a
precise standard subjects manufacturers to the whim of ubiqui-
tous judges and juries, unfairly trapping them between Scylla
Fatal if swallowed. Do not breathe vapor or fumes. Produces chemical
burns. Do not get in eyes, skin, or on clothing. Contains hydrochloric acid.




2' See, e.g., Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 248 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding manufacturer liable where severe burns resulted from spilled resin);
DeHaan v. Whink Prod. Co., 1994 WL 24322 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1994) (finding poten-
tial liability for injury caused by stain remover); Lee v. Crest Chem. Co., 583 F.
Supp. 131, 134 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (holding manufacturer of household cleaner not li-
able where user failed to wear gloves, reasoning that it was foreseeable that product
would otherwise come in contact with skin).
2'9 Jacobs, supra note 8, at 157.
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and Charybdis. Manufacturers must either incur liability by
listing every imaginable hazard, thereby producing an overly de-
tailed, unreadable warning, "or they must knowingly edit from
those warnings any mention of possibly obvious or remote risks
and thereby flirt with the distinct likelihood that if one of those
risks results in serious injury, they will be found responsible."3 °0
The "frequent confusion, inconsistency, and unpredictability
of decisions in the warning defect area of product liability law"
30 1
should impel the legal community, especially defenders of the
comment j presumption, to promulgate acceptable guidelines for
judging the adequacy of product warnings. Due to the lack of
"clear, academically-based criteria" to help courts evaluate the
merits of particular warning labels, "warning-related legal deci-
sions are frequently based upon intuitive rather than scientific
grounds."0 2 Many decisions are left open to criticism from Pro-
fessor Latin and other scholars who claim that the warning la-
bels currently applied to products "would not fare well" when
tested for effectiveness. 3
Reaching a consensus on the appropriate standards for de-
termining the adequacy of warnings is not an easy task.3 Due
to the necessarily product-specific nature of warnings, 35 courts
must evaluate each product's warning individually. 0 Since
30 Id.
'0 Latin, supra note 13, at 1275. Overlapping and occasionally conflicting federal
regulatory agencies further complicate the standardization of adequate warnings. See
Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from the "Need
to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 296 (1994) ("[I]t
is difficult for agencies to maintain consistency in the content and format of label
warnings for the products that they regulate. Even when an agency is internally con-
sistent, it often fails to coordinate its actions with other agencies.").
' Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 225.
' Id. at 261-62.
Michael Jacobs argues that "courts have struggled in vain with the adequacy
requirement, trying to bring solid legal form to a hopelessly malleable set of concepts."
Jacobs, supra note 8, at 145. See Noah, supra note 301, at 296-97 (positing that inter-
ests of disparate groups resulted in increasingly complicated and ineffective warnings).
3" See, e.g., Madden, supra note 8, at 310-11 ("[G]enerally the adequacy of warn-
ings or instructions will be a question of fact."); see also Cheney, supra note 99, at 566
("A manufacturer's duty to warn arises if the manufacturer knows of a possible danger
associated with the use of the product or when, by virtue of its special skill or knowl-
edge, the manufacturer reasonably should be expected to know of the danger.").
so' Even if the relevant behavioral sciences were more developed, and
courts more inclined and able to employ them seriously and intelligently,
the very structure of our traditional system of adjudication steers courts in
failure-to-warn cases away from optimal levels of risk information transfer.
The difficulty, which we refer to as the "seriatim effect," stems from the
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judging a warning's adequacy "requires consideration of both
form and content,"30 7 courts should consider general aspirational
criteria,"°8 the warning's clarity, °9 level of detail,310 effectiveness
in the communication of the risk of harm, 1' the size and location
of warnings, 11 the use of symbols to supplement or replace
fact that courts address claims ad seriatim, on a case-by-case basis .... A
possible solution to the difficulties in sketching the boundaries of optimal
information transfer, which the seriatim effect prevents, is to consider
clusters of fact patterns involving a given product at one time.
Henderson & Twersky, supra note 9, at 302; see VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 156 ("The
best method of achieving a well-designed warnings system is not to let the warnings
systems emerge from a series of decentralized court cases."); Jacobs, supra note 8, at
140 (stating that seriatim consideration of warnings leads "to the piecemeal and un-
controlled expansion of the content of warning labels").
3' Madden, supra note 8, at 311. One recent article suggests that courts should
shift the focus of their inquiries from the content of warnings to the process by which
the warnings are adopted. Under this scheme, courts adopt a presumption of legal
adequacy for any warning created and published pursuant to scientifically valid proce-
dures. See Jacobs, supra note 8, at 177-199.
308 See, e.g., Sales, supra note 21, at 551-52 (proposing dual standard for evaluat-
ing adequacy of warning: "(1) Is the warning calculated to reach the user of the product
in a form that would reasonably be expected to catch the attention of a prudent person
in the circumstances or environment of its use?" and "(2) Is the warning comprehen-
sible to the average user and does it convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of
the danger to the mind of a reasonably prudent person?"); Madden, supra note 8, at
309-10 (noting that warnings provide consumers with product safety information
available only to manufacturers).
309 "The use of concrete, rather than abstract words within warning labels and the
use of simple, short sentences, constructed in the standard subject-verb-object form
are two general rules for improving comprehension." Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at
236 (citation omitted). Clarity also enhances visual perception of information. For a
summary of "design parameters which have been found to be important in the design
of visual displays," see Dorris & Purswell, supra note 115, at 260.
310 The level of detail of warnings raises concerns of both under-inclusiveness and
over-inclusiveness. On the one hand, there is the debate over the problem of informa-
tion overload. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text. On the other hand, a
warning "may be found to be inadequate if the generality of the warning as a whole,
sometimes coupled with the promotion of the product in the most laudatory terms,
serves to detract from the warning's impact in the perception of the consumer or user."
Madden, supra note 8, at 317; see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 397 ("Labels have
little room ... and therefore usually give only 'category' instructions, such as 'avoid
open flames,' which leave consumers with considerable discretion.").
31 See, e.g., Sales, supra note 21, at 557 ("In general, an adequate warning must
communicate with such a degree of intensity that would cause a reasonable person to
exercise for his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential danger.");
Madden, supra note 8, at 223 ("To be adequate under any theory of liability, a neces-
sary warning, by its size, location and intensity of language or symbol, must be calcu-
lated to impress upon a reasonably prudent user of the product the nature and extent
of the hazard involved.")
312 A standardized warning format and lexicon, such as those promulgated by the
Food and Drug Administration for food, drug, and cosmetic labeling, would reduce the
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words,313 and communication of the consequences of misuse.314
Furthermore, courts must acknowledge the difficulty of design-
ing a warning and recognize that "the warning need only be one
that is reasonable under the circumstances and ... not ... the
best possible warning.""'
C. Warnings as Scapegoats
Professor Latin exploits the combination of the lack of
proven scientific legitimacy supporting warning law and a given
case's particularly grim facts even when there is little doubt that
the warnings at issue were adequate. Such tactics appeal to our
natural commiseration with accident victims and garner support
for the proposition that accident victims should not bear the
costs of their accidents. When a person suffers an injury, the
natural reaction is to blame someone or something, or at least
attempt to ease the victim's suffering. The manufacturer is
usually the someone and, in the absence of a defectively designed
or manufactured product, comment j is the something.
An example of Professor Latin's appeal to emotion is his
analysis of Temple v. Velcro USA, Inc.316 While the victim's
death was tragic and unnecessary, the victim chose to use Velcro
in a way unintended by the manufacturer and contrary to a
clear, strongly-worded warning that was mailed to him person-
ally. Despite the natural pangs of sympathy one feels for the
victim's surviving wife, this case does not impugn the reliability
of good warnings or the comment j presumption.
Another example of Professor Latin's appeal to emotion is
his analysis of Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon,317 where a fourteen-year-
disparity of court decrees concerning the adequacy of warnings. See VISCUSI, supra
note 14, at 155-56 (discussing rationale behind national warnings policy that would
"establish standards for situations in which particular words, means of emphasis, indi-
cations of risk severity, and formats would be used."); ALI REPORTER'S STUDY, supra
note 9, at 74-76 (advocating creation of "uniform national vocabulary for the communi-
cation of information respecting risk levels" by federal government); Jacobs, supra note
8, at 148 (noting plethora of factors utilized by courts to deem warnings adequate).
3 For a summary of the literature on the use of safety symbols to communicate
safety messages, see Lehto & Miller, supra note 17, at 238-245.
31 See, e.g., Cooley v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376-80 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984) (finding product only alerted buyers to possibility of adverse consequences if
misused).
3' Gurley v. American Honda Motor Co., 505 So. 2d 358, 361 (Ala. 1987).
"' 196 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Ct. App. 1983); see supra notes 277-83 and accompanying
text.
317 450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982).
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old shot and killed a friend with a pump-up air rifle."' The user
was aware of the rifle's dangerous propensity,319 but took the gun
without obtaining permission from his parents or having read
the instructions. When he "pointed the barrel of the Power King
at the decedent's head" while "horsing around," the rifle dis-
charged.32 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the in-
structions and warning were adequate, and that the gun's user
was "legally chargeable with sufficient appreciation of the risk of
his misuse of the Power King .... Although this particular ac-
cident could not have been prevented by either a design im-
provement or a warning, the victim's death was tragic and un-
necessary. The pity we feel for the victim's family does not
change the fact that the tragic nature of this accident can be at-
tributed to the reckless conduct of the teenager and perhaps his
parents, not the product's warning.
322
8 Id. at, 618-19.
3'9 The court stated that:
Robert Saenz was aware that "depending on how many times you pumped
[the rifle] up," the BBs fired from the rifle could shatter ... bottles and
pierce through ... cans. He also testified that he had known that the air ri-
fle was "some[what more] powerful" than the spring BB guns he had previ-
ously used. Moreover, he knew that a BB fired from the Power King could
blind a person and that he should never point a gun at anyone. Indeed,
Robert Saenz testified that he had expected to use the Power King to kill
rabbits and rats.
Id. at 617-18.
310 Id. at 618.
321 Id. The gun's operator manual stated in part:
The Pump-Up Air Gun is a new, much more powerful type gun than the
traditional Daisy spring-air BB guns. It ... must be treated with great care
and respect. ALWAYS HANDLE A GUN AS IF IT WERE LOADED.
'Handling' means every time you touch your gun. It also means you must
never point your gun toward any living thing nor at any part of your own
body nor at anything that could be damaged by an accidental shot ...
CAUTION: Due to the additional power of the Pump-up Air Gun, extra
precaution is required in selecting a safe target.
Id. at 619 n.5.
32 For cases that address the responsibility of a parent to oversee a child, see su-
pra note 100.
Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 579 P.2d 183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978), is another ex-
ample of a consumer abusing a product despite a reasonable, effective warning. In
Michael, the plaintiff damaged his kidneys by taking four over-the-counter sinus
medication tablets per day for several years. Id. at 184-85. The drug's warning label
stated: "This medication may damage the kidneys when used in large amounts or
for a long period of time. Do not take more than the recommended dosage, nor take
regularly for longer than 10 days without consulting your physician .... IN CASE OF
ACCIDENTAL OVERDOSE, CONTACT A PHYSICIAN IMMEDIATELY." Id. at




The debate over the adequacy of warnings should not be
viewed as an all-or-nothing struggle between exculpating the
manufacturer or forcing it to pay. If a product contains a legally
adequate warning, an injured consumer may still recover dam-
ages under an alternate theory of liability.323 Although the com-
ment j presumption precludes holding a manufacturer strictly li-
able on the theory that the product is "unreasonably dangerous"
for use, a plaintiff is not barred from pursuing the alternative
theories of manufacturing defect or design defect."4 Further-
more, a manufacturer cannot contract out of negligence by pro-
viding a warning."' Thus, all potentially hazardous products do
not raise the concerns enunciated by Professor Latin: only those
products that can cause harm and which were properly designed
and manufactured are entitled to the comment j presumption.
The Restatement (Third) Draft elucidates this point. The
Draft denotes three kinds of product defects: manufacturing de-
fects, design defects, and warning defects.326 Manufacturers are
strictly liable for manufacturing defects, while design defects
and warning defects are judged by a negligence standard.327 In
addition, the availability of these three separate causes of action
under the Restatement (Third) Draft does not prevent the plain-
is so extreme as to be almost beyond belief," the New Mexico Court of Appeals re-
fused to grant summary judgment to the defendant, holding that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to the warning's adequacy. Id. at 186.
3 Professor Latin asserts that the 'comment j presumption in effect precludes
judicial assessment of alternative means to improve product safety." Latin, supra note
13, at 1257. He claims that current warning law precludes further legal analysis "by
excluding consideration of better product designs, product substitutes, marketing
practices, or better warnings that could reduce accident risks." Id. at 1196. He further
contends that "[clourts in 'good' warning cases have typically been unwilling to deter-
mine whether manufacturers provided 'the maximum of protection' or even a reason-
able level of protection on the ground that users could have avoided the injuries if they
had heeded product warnings." Id. at 1196-97 (emphasis in original).
32 "[Wlarnings will not exculpate when the product has a manufacturing or de-
sign defect." ALI REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 9, at 57-58.
' See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978)
("[Wiarnings cannot absolve the manufacturer or designer of all responsibility for
the safety of the product.")
326 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT § 2; see supra notes 33-42 and accompanying
text.
3'27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFT §2 cmt. a; see Uoth, 384 N.E.2d at 1192 (noting
that adequate warnings do not absolve product manufacturer of liability where rea-
sonable design alternatives exist); see also Sales, supra note 21, at 585 ("Logically, the
concept of warning falls within the aegis of negligence and not strict tort liability.").
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tiff from proving that the product was "physically flawed, dam-
aged, or incorrectly assembled,"328 or that "a reasonable alterna-
tive design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foresee-
able risks of harm posed by the product and ... the omission of
the alternative design rendered the product not reasonably
safe.3 29
The fact that an adequate warning on a dangerous product
will be worded to reduce the product's marketability, which will
force manufacturers to improve the design of the product or re-
move it from the market, further mitigates the anti-consumer ef-
fects of comment j.330 McCormack v. Hankscraft Company33' il-
lustrates this proposition. The defendant manufactured a
vaporizer that spilled scalding water when tipped over, creating
a serious risk of severe burns.332 Professor Twersky and his co-
authors suggest the following warning as adequate for this prod-
uct:
THIS VAPORIZER WHEN OPERATING IS FILLED WITH
SCALDING HOT WATER-IF THIS VAPORIZER IS TIPPED,
THE WATER WILL POUR OUT AND ONE COULD BE
SERIOUSLY INJURED OR KILLED-DO NOT USE IN THE
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) DRAFr §2 cmt. b; see, e.g., Glover v. Bic Corp., 6 F.3d
1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[A] product with a manufacturing defect ... cannot be
made 'non-defective' simply by placing a warning on the product.") (emphasis in origi-
nal); Alter v. Bell Helicopter, 1996 WL 617321 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996).
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Draft §2 cmt. c. In discussing the relationship between
product design and warnings, the Restatement (Third) Draft also realizes that:
instructions and warnings may be ineffective because it reasonably can be
foreseen that users of the product cannot be adequately reached, are likely
to be inattentive, or are insufficiently motivated to follow the instructions
or heed the warnings. Thus, when a safer design can reasonably be imple-
mented, adoption of the safer design is preferable to a warning that leaves
a residuum of risk. When an alternative design to avoid risks cannot rea-
sonably be implemented, adequate instructions and warnings will be suffi-
dent to render the product reasonably safe.
Id. at cmt. k. This partially addresses Professor Latin's concern that '[product warn-
ings and other disclosure mechanisms can be effective only when intended recipients
are able to receive, comprehend, and act upon the information imparted." Latin, supra
note 13, at 1195. It also partially allays his fear that a good warning can excuse a
product that is "badly designed." Id. at 1264.
S0 If an accurate warning renders a product unmarketable, the manufacturer
will certainly evaluate alternative designs in an effort to increase sales and avoid
the imposition of strict liability under a design defect cause of action. See Twersky
et al., supra note 26, at 501 (citing Note, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty
to Warn Cases: Distinction and Misconception, 1968 WIs. L. REV. 228, 234 (1968)).
331 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967).
312 Id. at 491.
"COMMENT J" PARRY
VICINITY OF CHILDREN.333
Such a warning "would sharply curtail if not entirely elimi-
nate the marketability of the product as well as its utility for use
with children."3 4 Professor Twersky is sympathetic to "the
court's sensitivity to the harshness of an edict that would require
a manufacturer to place a warning on a product which would de-
stroy its marketability."3 1 If the product is as dangerous as the
warning claims, however, the product does not deserve to be
marketable, unless its dangers are deemed reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances.336 A warning label is the messen-
ger, not the message, and a product poses a threat of injury
whether or not consumers are aware of the product's inherent
danger. Devious manufacturers will attempt to avoid disclosing
unattractive facts about its products. The courts, however, do
not have to act as accomplices in this dangerous deception.
While this Article attempts to refute Professor Latin's strong
attack on the comment j presumption, the larger issues of the
scope of a manufacturer's duty to warn, the form that product
warnings should take, and the legal effect that warnings should
have remain to be settled. The consequences of these battles will
be of no small import. It is no surprise that the product warn-
ings battlefield is increasingly crowded, for not only do product
warnings confront us daily, but, as Professor Latin states, the le-
gal analysis of warnings "raises, in perhaps its most striking
form, the fundamental question whether manufacturers or con-
sumers should bear the primary responsibility for accident pre-
vention in product-use settings."337
3 Twersky et al., supra note 26, at 503.
See id.
m Id. at 504.
338 Id.337 Latin, supra note 13, at 1197.
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